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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
CANDACE J. FABRI*
STEVEN H. NARDULLI**
In recent years, the major portion of every appellate court docket
consists of criminal appeals, and the Seventh Circuit is no exception.
Between May 31, 1978 and May 31, 1979, the court issued over one
hundred published criminal decisions' dealing with a myriad of issues
in substantive and procedural criminal law. A survey article such as
this is necessarily cursory in its review of these numerous cases, how-
ever, it is our intent to examine, evaluate and compare the most signifi-
cant of these decisions. This article is directed toward the federal
criminal practitioner, and its purpose is to complement the practi-
tioner's familiarity with basic principles of criminal procedure.
The organization of the article follows the criminal justice process,
from the acquisition of evidence through petitions for habeas corpus.
Pre-trial issues, such as search and seizure, grand jury, discovery, the
use of magistrates, and the Speedy Trial Act, have been examined ini-
tially. Those issues traditionally associated with trial, including the ad-
ministration of jury trials, admissibility of specific evidence, jury
instructions, closing arguments, and sentencing have been approached
from the practitioner's point of view. Lastly, post-trial issues such as
prisoners' rights and remedies have been considered.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
During the past court term, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted the
fourth amendment warrant requirement in several contexts. The court
was faced with the threshold issue, the distinction between governmen-
tal and private searches and seizures, in United States v. Zperstein.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law; J.D., Illinois
Institute of Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
** Staff Attorney, Federal Defender Program, Chicago, Illinois; J.D., Illinois Institute of
Technology/Chicago-Kent College of Law.
I. Many criminal appeals are resolved each year by unpublished orders which lack prece-
dential value and cannot be cited per Circuit Rule 35. These unpublished orders are not consid-
ered in this article except where reference to an unpublished order is helpful to an understanding
of the court's current position.
2. 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
The search and seizure challenged in Zoperstein was performed by
Harlan Eisentraut, an employee in one of Ziperstein's twenty-eight
health care clinics. Ziperstein's medical clinics were under investiga-
tion for mail fraud in connection with Medicaid, and in late July, 1976,
Eisentraut contacted the Federal Bureau of Investigation3 stating that
he had evidence and knowledge of possible illegal activity at Ziper-
stein's clinic. Eisentraut told the FBI agent that there were documents
in a storage room at the clinic, including prescriptions filled by Eisen-
traut personally, prescriptions filled by Ziperstein's employees prior to
Eisentraut's employment, and pre-stamped prescription forms. The
agent "expressed an interest in them," and two days later, Eisentraut
brought the documents from Ziperstein's storage room to the FBI.
Ziperstein moved to suppress the documents as unlawfully seized, how-
ever, the trial judge found that Eisentraut had obtained access to these
materials legitimately, and thereafter surrendered them to the FBI
without any inducement by the government. Finding that the seizure
was a purely private act by Eisentraut, the court denied the motion to
suppress.
On appeal, Ziperstein argued that the documents admitted at trial
were stolen from him and that the government involvement with Eisen-
traut brought the seizure within the scope of the fourth amendment
warrant requirement. The Seventh Circuit held that as no governmen-
tal participation in the removal of the documents had been established,
and as Ziperstein had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the docu-
ments kept in the storage rooms, the fourth amendment warrant re-
quirement was inapplicable.
The fourth amendment restricts only governmental acquisition of
evidence; it has no impact on the acts of private citizens who obtain
evidence of a crime. Thus, if a private citizen surrenders evidence in
his possession to law enforcement officials, regardless of the manner in
which the evidence was obtained, the fourth amendment does not ap-
ply.4 Conversely, if a law enforcement official causes a private citizen
to obtain evidence on behalf of the government, the seizure must be
measured against fourth amendment standards, as the agent cannot cir-
cumvent the restriction by inducing citizens to act on his behalf.5 The
3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is hereinafter referred to as the FBI.
4. Seegenerally Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921) (unlawful seizure of the defend-
ant's property by a private citizen which pre-dated by several months the surrender of the prop-
erty to the government held not a government search); United States v. Harper, 458 F.2d 891 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972) (where witness unlawfully obtained records eight
months prior to his first contact with government agents held not a government seizure).
5. Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1966); see also United States v. Newton,
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facts in Ziperstein do not fit comfortably into either category. The pri-
vate citizen, Eisentraut, had access to evidence which was not physi-
cally in his custody. He contacted the FBI, and on learning they were
"interested," Eisentraut unlawfully removed the documents from
Ziperstein's clinic and brought them to the FBI. Although the agent
did not specifically direct Eisentraut to seize the materials, it is note-
worthy that the agent did not seek a search warrant based on the facts
initially disclosed by Eisentraut, the citizen informant.
In holding that the evidence was properly admitted, the court of
appeals noted that "[a]n identical result was reached in this circuit in
United States v. Bilingsley."6 The results in Ziperstein and Billingsley
are identical, however, the facts are not. In Billingsley, one Gander was
the acting secretary of the corporation under investigation, and in that
capacity he was given the corporate books and records. 7 After they had
been transferred to his custody, Gander examined them, and several
weeks later, he contacted the FBI and gave them the documents which
evidenced criminal activity. The record established that no "law en-
forcement officer suggested to Gander that he obtain records [and]...
neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor any state or local law
enforcement officer directly or indirectly induced [Gander] . . .to ob-
tain the records. At the time [Gander] . . .removed the records. . . he
was not under investigation." 8 On these facts, the Seventh Circuit spe-
cifically found that:
the record does not support defendant's assertion that Gander acted
either at government direction or for the purpose of assisting the in-
vestigation. His role as a corporate official and custodian of the cor-
porate documents reasonably suggests that he obtained the items
presently challenged for purposes quite independent of any assist-
ance they might be to federal investigators. 9
Ziperstein argued that Gander's lawful acquisition of the records
in question, well prior to his first contact with the FBI, distinguished
Billingsley. Relying on Knoll Associates, Inc. v. FTC10 and United
510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975) (search of luggage by airline employees conducted in the presence of
federal agents held to be a government search).
6. 601 F.2d at 289. See United States v. Billingsley, 440 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1971).
7. Gander took possession of the corporate records pursuant to his duties. Another corpo-
rate officer, who was subsequently indicted, helped Gander carry the records to his car. 440 F.2d
at 826.
8. Id at 825.
9. Id at 826.
10. 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968). In Knoll, an employee of Knoll Associates contacted the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) stating, "I have enough papers to hang them." Id Afterwards,
the employee brought the records to the FTC and the records were used as evidence against Knoll
Associates in their hearing before the Commission. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the em-
ployee "stole the documents for the purpose of assisting the Commission ... in the prosecution
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States v. Stein, I I Ziperstein contended that Eisentraut's contact with
the FBI prior to his seizure of the evidence was indicative of govern-
ment encouragement and participation. The Seventh Circuit dist-
inguished Knoll as "the documents obtained were apparently not
related to the duties of the employee who took them."' 2 The court dist-
inguished Stein as the private citizen "never asserted that he had any
legitimate access to the documents."' 3 While these distinctions have
some arguable application to the prescriptions filled by Eisentraut per-
sonally and later stored in the storage room at Ziperstein's clinic, it is
difficult to determine Eisentraut's relationship to the prescriptions filled
by other pharmacists prior to his employment, or the pre-stamped pre-
scription forms which he discovered.
Examination of the cases from this circuit indicates a test of associ-
ation in fact, which focuses on the relationship between the govern-
mental contact or inducement and the acquisition of evidence by the
citizen. Billingsley, Knoll Associates, and Stein articulate a reasoned
approach: where possession preceeds government contact, the fourth
amendment cannot be implicated, where possession follows govern-
ment contact, the fourth amendment assures scrutiny of the citizen-
government relationship.14 By refusing to distinguish knowledge from
physical custody, Zoierstein avoids that scrutiny.
A further part of the court's rationale in approving the search in
Ziperstein was premised on Ziperstein's lessened expectation of privacy
in the documents kept in the clinic storage room. The court noted that
...then pending," and held the order unenforceable because it was based on illegally obtained
evidence. Id at 533.
11. 322 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. I11. 1971). In Stein, a co-tenant in Stein's office negotiated with
the FBI and the United States Attorney to obtain assurance that he would not be indicted. The
co-tenant thereafter turned some of Stein's documents over to the FBI. The district court found
"no clear.., evidence that [the co-tenant] was an agent of the government at this time . . . but
there [was] ...ample reason to believe that [the co-tenant] thought the government would re-
ward him for turning over these records." Id at 348. (It is noteworthy that Eisentraut was not
among the four Ziperstein pharmacists indicted). In suppressing the evidence in Stein, the district
court found that the government was not "totally divorced" from the acquisition of the evidence
and that the fourth amendment protections were applicable. Id. In United States v. Bastone, 526
F.2d 971, 978 n.4 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973 (1976), the Seventh Circuit character-
ized the holding in Stein as one where "government encourage[ment of] a private individual's
irregular acquisition of certain evidence renderled] the exclusionary rule applicable."
12. 601 F.2d at 290.
13. Id
14. In Ziperstein, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that Eisentraut
gained possession of the documents before his contact with the FBI. The undisputed facts showed
that Eisentraut had temporary possession of the prescription he personally filled, and knowledge
of the other prescriptions which he removed from the storage room. Eisentraut did not have
physical possession of any of the records at the time he first spoke with agents of the FBI. 601
F.2d at 289.
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what employees "observe in their daily functions is undoubtedly be-
yond the employer's reasonable expectation of privacy,"' 5 and the Sev-
enth Circuit found that "employee disclosures . . . [are] beyond the
purview of any fourth amendment restraints."' 6 In Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., the Supreme Court held that an employee is free to report
to the authorities evidence of non-compliance with Occupational
Health and Safety Regulations which the employee observes on the
job. Ziperstein equates disclosure with seizure. There is no doubt un-
der Marshall that Eisentraut could have disclosed to the FBI the infor-
mation he acquired on the job. That information could further have
been used as the basis for a search warrant. Marshall, however, does
not address the relationship between the lessened expectation of pri-
vacy with respect to employees, and the seizure of employer's docu-
ments by employees assisting a federal investigation.
This lessened expectation of privacy was also the basis for the af-
firmance by the court of appeals of two cases which arose from border
searches, United States v. Carter17 and United States v. Washington.' 8
Relying on United States v. Ramsey,' 9 the Seventh Circuit held that
border searches at any border are reasonable per se as they are related
to the right of the sovereign to protect itself. The first point of entry
into the United States is a functional border, thus the court in Carter
affirmed a search of a passenger and his luggage at Chicago-O'Hare
International Airport after arrival on a direct flight from Europe. The
border search rationale applies equally to items which enter the United
States from abroad by mail. In United States v. Washington,20 the court
characterized mail sent from the Canal Zone to the United States as
mail from a foreign country subject to warrantless search at the point of
entry without regard to the fourth amendment requirements. 2'
In addition to the border exception to the fourth amendment war-
rant requirement, during the past term the Seventh Circuit examined
the circumstances under which a warrantless "plain view" seizure is
permissible. The traditional formulation of the test is that if the seizing
officers inadvertently discover evidence of a crime or contraband in a
15. Id., quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
16. 601 F.2d at 289.
17. 592 F.2d 402 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 908 (1979).
18. 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
19. 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977). See also United States v. Brown, 499 F.2d 829 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1047 (1974).
20. 586 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir. 1978).
21. But see Torres v. Puerto Rico, 99 S. Ct. 2425 (1979) (luggage carried between Puerto Rico
and the United States mainland held not subject to the border search exception to the fourth
amendment).
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place where they have a right to be, the search is reasonable, despite the
absence of a search warrant. 22 Both plain view seizures considered by
the court, United States v. Rizzo 23 and United States v. Schire,24 were
incidental to seizures with validly obtained warrants. Rizzo was a pri-
vate detective under investigation for suspected illegal wiretapping. In
connection with the investigation, the FBI obtained a search warrant
for Rizzo's car and wiretapping paraphernalia. The agents proceeded
with the warrant to the home of the estranged wife of Rizzo's client
where they observed Rizzo's car parked in the area. Prior to executing
the warrant, the agents observed Rizzo walk from the home toward his
car carrying a cassette for a tape recorder. Based on information in the
warrant, the agents believed that the wiretapping method involved tape
cassettes, and the agents seized the cassette from Rizzo's hand on a
plain view theory.25 In evaluating Rizzo's claim that the tape was un-
lawfully seized and improperly admitted at trial, the Seventh Circuit
properly concluded that the warrant could not justify the seizure. The
court found, however, that the sight of Rizzo carrying a cassette which
the agents had reason to believe was evidence of a crime was "unantici-
pated" 26 and due to the risk of destruction of evidence the seizure fell
within the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. 27
The assessment in Rizzo is consistent with the guidelines articu-
lated by the Supreme Court in Coolidge t,. New Hampshire28 that:
The limits on the doctrine are ...that plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence . . . absent exi-
gent circumstances . . . The second limitation is that the discovery
of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent .. . .But where the
discovery is anticipated, where the police know in advance the loca-
tion of the evidence and intend to seize it, the situation is altogether
different. 29
The risk of destruction of evidence by Rizzo satisfied the exigent cir-
22. See generall, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-74 (1971).
23. 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
24. 586 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978).
25. Rizzo was not placed under arrest at this time, thus the search incident to arrest exception
to the warrant requirement was inapplicable. 583 F.2d at 910. Butsee Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291 (1973). For a discussion of the requirements for a search incident to arrest, see United States
v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978). In Mancillas, the
court of appeals also considered the effect of United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977) on the
seizure and search, incident to arrest, of a package of heroin.
26. 583 F.2d at 910.
27. The plain view exception had not previously been applied to a seizure of evidence or
contraband from the person which could not also be justified as a search and seizure incident to
arrest.
28. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
29. Id at 468-70.
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cumstances limitation, and the Seventh Circuit found that the seizure
of the tape cassette from Rizzo was "unanticipated" and thus inadver-
tent. The Seventh Circuit used the term unanticipated as synonomous
with inadvertent, however, United States v. Schire,30 brings the distinc-
tion into focus.
In Schire, the court considered the plain view exception with re-
spect to evidence discovered during the execution of a search warrant.
The warrant was obtained as part of an investigation of an auto theft
ring, and it described the area of a warehouse to be searched, unit 4,
and the item to be seized, a silver Trans Am automobile. The agents
were also armed with an arrest warrant for Schire, and when they ar-
rived at unit 4, they found Schire working on a Grand Prix. Schire was
arrested, the search warrant was executed, and the silver Trans Am was
located in unit 3 of the warehouse. A tow truck was summoned for the
Trans Am, and information obtained from the tow truck driver and
portions of other cars in the warehouse caused agents to believe that
the Grand Prix might also have been stolen.3' The agents seized the
Grand Prix as evidence of a crime, and, along with the Trans Am, it
was admitted against Schire at his trial on charges of receiving and
concealing stolen automobiles.
It can certainly be anticipated or expected that officers with a war-
rant describing the activity of an auto theft ring will find stolen cars
during its execution. The anticipation or expectation, however, can
range from "a weak hunch to a strong suspicion," 32 without vitiating
the applicability of the plain view exception. The term "inadvertent"
in the plain view context means that police lack probable cause to be-
lieve that the evidence will be discovered until they actually observe it.
The anticipation or expectation of the officer is not determinative, un-
30. 586 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978).
31. On these facts, Schire argued that the seizure of the Grand Prix was an impermissible
"second search" contending that when the agents located the Trans Am, the object of the search,
the search should have terminated. Citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (re-entry of
burned building by arson investigators five hours after fire extinguished held continuation of first
entry and not a second search), the Seventh Circuit summarily rejected Schire's claim. Schire also
claimed that the incriminating nature of the Grand Prix was not immediately apparent, in con-
tending that the plain view theory should be rejected. The court summarily rejected this argu-
ment, noting that the incriminating character of a luxury car in an auto theft ring can be
immediately apparent. Compare United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1158 (1974) (incriminating nature of rifle not immediately apparent; improper to seize
serial number of rifle for later check at the National Arms Information Center) with United States
v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739 (7th Cir. 1976) (incriminating nature of letters and mail immediately
apparent during investigation for stolen mailbag).
32. United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979). See also United States v. Bolts, 558
F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 898 (1978).
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less it amounts to probable cause with plain view used as a ploy or
device to avoid the warrant requirement.
The scope of a warrantless automobile search in the course of a
Terry v. Ohio-type stop 33 was examined by the Seventh Circuit this
term in United States v. Rainone.34 Rainone and his co-defendant, Cir-
celli, were observed by police officers as they sat in their car in a restau-
rant parking lot at about 3:00 a.m. The restaurant was closed and the
parking lot was dark. The officers approached the car and asked Rai-
none and Circelli to identify themselves and explain their presence in
the parking lot. Circelli, seated in the driver's seat of the car, produced
a driver's license, but Rainone was unable to produce any identifica-
tion. Although the testimony was in dispute, Rainone and Circelli in-
dicated they were related to the owner of the restaurant. One of the
officers present had previous knowledge that the restaurant owner was
involved in a violent intra-family feud, and the officers then ordered
Rainone and Circelli out of the car. Rainone and Circelli were frisked
or patted down but no weapons were found. Before permitting Rai-
none and Circelli to reenter their car, one officer conducted a brief
search of the car. On the floor beneath the front seat, the officer found
a stick of dynamite and a detonating device. Rainone and Circelli were
charged with possession of that destructive device.
The Seventh Circuit applied the rationale of Terry, the protection
of police officers, 35 in upholding the validity of the automobile search.
Certainly, Terry justified the initial intrusion and pat down, as the of-
ficers could point to "specific and articulable facts which together with
the rational inferences from those facts reasonably warrant[ed] the of-
ficers' belief that [they were] in danger." 36 In extending the Terry frisk
of the person rationale to permit a search of the area of the suspect's
control, the Seventh Circuit read Chimel v. California37 into the Terry
analysis. Thus, the court held that a search "limited to what is mini-
mally necessary to uncover weapons to which the suspect will have easy
access" 38 is not unreasonable. 39 This apparent extension of Terry,
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. 586 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1978).
35. "The sole justification of the search in the present situation is the protection of the police
officers and others nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably
designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 29 (1968).
36. Id. at 21.
37. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
38. 586 F.2d at 1135.
39. This concept of the future area of the suspect's control has been questioned by one court,
which reasoned that "any weapon which might have been hidden in the car would have been
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however, from a search of the person to a search of the area, may prove
problematic in application. 40
A somewhat unusual fourth amendment issue was presented to the
court in United States v. Washington,4' where a beacon transmitting
device or transponder was installed in a shipment of contraband drugs
prior to delivery. The Seventh Circuit noted that the use of surrepti-
tiously installed electronic tracking devices is an emerging issue in the
area of search and seizure. However, the court declined to fully ex-
amine the fourth amendment ramifications as an order based on proba-
ble cause had been obtained in Washington. The Ninth Circuit in
United States v. Dubrofsk 4 2 has posited a bifurcated approach to the
fourth amendment inquiry necessitated by use of these tracking de-
vices. The first level of analysis examines the actual installation or at-
tachment of the transponder for possible fourth amendment violations.
The second level of analysis examines the fourth amendment implica-
tions of the use of the transponder once attached or installed. Although
this analytical framework was not specifically used by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Washington, the court implicitly resolved the first level of in-
quiry by holding that the transponder was implanted in an object
containing contraband pursuant to a lawful border search; thus Wash-
ington had "no right to possess [it] and . . . no legitimate expectation
of privacy."' 43 Other circuits have concurred in this approach to the
installation of transponders in seized contraband, 44 essentially rejecting
any fourth amendment protection for illegal goods.
Because the transponder installation in Washington was accompa-
nied by a court order in compliance with the warrant requirement, the
outside the reach of either suspect and could not have presented a danger to the officers while they
were conducting their investigation." Canal Zone v. Bender, 573 F.2d 1329, 1332 (5th Cir. 1978)
(mere presence of suspects in parked car in remote area insufficient to justify search of car for
weapons, particularly as the suspects themselves were not patted down). But see United States v.
Green, 465 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (furtive gesture by occupant of car sufficient to justify search
of car following pat down of occupants).
40. The Court in Terry declined to "develop at length ... the limitation which the Fourth
Amendment places upon a protective seizure and search for weapons . . .[recognizing that] these
limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases."
392 U.S. at 29. The touchstone for resolving these individual cases must be the objective standard
of Terry, requiring an articulable suspicion specifically relating to weapons or danger.
41. 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
42. 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
43. 586 F.2d at 1154.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Prin-
gle, 576 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied
sub nom., Bobisink v. United States, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887
(1st Cir. 1976).
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Seventh Circuit did not consider whether the use of such a tracking
device was a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment .4
This issue is likely to be presented to the court again in view of the
frequent use of transponders in cars, planes, boats, and other non-con-
traband items.4 6
The limits of governmental power to retain property after seizure
without formal commencement of prosecution was considered by the
court in Mr. Lucky Messenger Service v. United Slates.47 Pursuant to a
search warrant, FBI agents seized approximately $65,000 in cash from
the premises of the messenger service. After eighteen months, Mr.
Lucky Messenger filed suit for return of the property,48 as no indict-
ment had been returned against the corporation or any of its agents or
employees.4 9 In seeking the return of the cash, Mr. Lucky Messenger
invoked the general equity jurisdiction of the court, claiming that the
retention of the funds for eighteen months without any accompanying
criminal charges, amounted to a "callous disregard for. . . [the corpo-
ration's] constitutional rights."' 50 In remanding the case for a hearing in
the district court, the Seventh Circuit framed the issue in terms of the
need for the government to establish "adequate justification ' 5' for
withholding the funds without bringing any criminal charges. The
court further noted the applicability of the traditional principles which
govern equitable relief, irreparable injury with no adequate remedy at
law.
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
During the past court term, the Seventh Circuit had little difficulty
in applying the exclusionary rule in the context of statements and ad-
45. Compare United States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) with United States v.
Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1978).
46. For a thorough examination of cases considering use of transponders with moving vehi-
cles or planes, see generalp United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir. 1979).
47. 587 F.2d 15 (7th Cir. 1978).
48. Mr. Lucky Messenger Service did not challenge the legality of the search or move to
suppress the fruits pursuant to rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But see United
States v. One Residence & Attached Garage of Anthony Accardo, 603 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1979)
(pre-indictment rule 41 motion for return of $275,000 seized in search granted).
49. The absence of any criminal charge permitted Mr. Lucky Messenger Service to appeal
the district court dismissal of its claim. Citing DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131-32
(1962), the Seventh Circuit noted that a motion for return of seized property is a final appealable
order only if the motion is not tied to a criminal prosecution in esse, that is, one which has shifted
from the investigatory stage to the accusatory stage. 587 F.2d at 16. See United States v. One
Residence & Attached Garage of Anthony Accardo, 603 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1979).




missions. A single case, United States v. Guerrero-Herrera,2 addressed
the issue of the validity of a defendant's waiver of rights. In Guerrero-
Herrera, the defendant was given an advice or rights form printed in
Spanish, as an agent read out loud from the form. Guerrero-Herrera
indicated that he understood his rights and signed the waiver form,53
thereafter making inculpatory statements which were the subject of the
motion to suppress. Guerrero-Herrera conceded that the waiver form
complied with the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona,54 but claimed
that he only understood Spanish in the Mexican dialect and that the
rights were given in the Cuban dialect. The Seventh Circuit found that
the government had met its burden of proof in that the preponderance
of the evidence 55 indicated that the statements were made voluntarily.
In a somewhat different context, the Seventh Circuit examined the
use of pre-arrest silence as impeachment in United States ex rel Allen v.
Rowe. 56 The evidence adduced at Allen's state trial indicated that after
an argument with his estranged wife, Allen shot and killed her. The
police were called to the scene, and prior to being arrested or advised of
his Miranda rights, Allen volunteered that he had shot his wife and that
she was badly hurt. Allen was then arrested and subsequently charged
with murder. At trial, Allen testified that his estranged wife had a his-
tory of violence, and on the night of the shooting he acted in self-de-
fense as she attacked him. During cross-examination, the prosecutor
impeached Allen's self-defense claim, by emphasizing that Allen had
not mentioned self-defense just prior to his arrest when he told the po-
lice he had shot his wife. In his closing argument, the prosecutor again
referred to Allen's failure to offer his self-defense explanation prior to
trial. 57 Allen was convicted of murder, and the conviction was affirmed
on appeal by an Illinois appellate court. Thereafter, Allen sought to
52. 590 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1978). The Seventh Circuit also addressed the issue of the volunta-
riness of a confession in a petition for habeas corpus in United States ex rel. Hall v. Director of the
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 578 F.2d 194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978). In Hall,
the court approved the use of the totality of the circumstances test in upholding the voluntariness
of a confession given after police officers misled Hall as to the nature of his accomplice's post-
arrest statements.
53. No explicit waiver of rights is necessary and had Guerrero-Herrera refused to sign the
waiver form, that would not preclude admissibility of the statement. North Carolina v. Butler,
441 U.S. 369 (1979) (defendant read advice of rights form but refused to sign it: confession admit-
ted as circumstances indicated voluntariness). See also United States v. Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242
(7th Cir. 1978).
54. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
55. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
56. 591 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1979).
57. For further discussion of prosecutorial comment on exercise of the fifth amendment priv-
ilege, see notes 323-36 infra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Muscarella, 585
F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
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collaterally attack the conviction by federal habeas corpus, claiming
constitutional error in the state prosecutor's conduct during trial.
In Doyle v. Ohio,58 the Supreme Court held that "use for impeach-
ment purposes of [a defendant's] silence, at the time of arrest and after
receiving Miranda warnings, violate[s] the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment." 59 In reversing the conviction, the court in
Doyle reasoned that the Miranda warnings carry an implicit guarantee
that no penalty will attach to the exercise of the privilege, and permit-
ting impeachment by silence after being so advised would diminish the
value of the privilege.
In applying Doyle to the facts in Allen, the Seventh Circuit held
that Doyle precluded impeachment by pre-arrest, pre-Miranda warn-
ing, omissions from a confession. 60 The court perceived no basis for
distinction between the pre-Miranda warning context and post-Mi-
randa warning context.61 The court did not find it significant that Al-
len had made a less than complete statement to the police rather than
fully exercising his right to remain silent. Equating impeachment by
omission in this case with impeachment by silence, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed the district court order granting the writ of habeas corpus. 6 2
A related problem to the fifth amendment issues posed by use of a
defendant's own statements is the sixth amendment confrontation
problem presented by the use of inculpatory statements of a non-testi-
fying co-defendant during a joint trial. In Bruton v. United States,63 the
Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who had been
implicated in the crime by his co-defendant's post-arrest confession. As
Bruton's co-defendant did not testify at trial and was not subject to
cross-examination, the Court held that Bruton was denied his sixth
amendment right of confrontation by the admission of the inculpatory
58. 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
59. Id. at 619. Prior to the decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court had
prohibited impeachment by post-arrest, post-Miranda warning silence as overly prejudicial while
lacking in probative value, pursuant to its supervisory powers over the federal courts. United
States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975).
60. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 n.l 1 (1976), specifically notes that the fact of post-arrest
silence may be used to impeach a testifying defendant who claims at trial to have given an excul-
patory statement to the police at the time of his arrest. The Court commented that use of post-
arrest silence in that circumstance was not impeaching of the exculpatory statement offered at
trial, but rather impeaching of the defendant's testimony as to his conduct following arrest.
61. Accord, United States v. Henderson, 565 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1978) (pre-arrest silence intol-
erably prejudicial and not probative, citing United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1974)).
62. A contrary result appears to have been reached in Twyman v. Oklahoma, 560 F.2d 422
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978) (defendant's detailed post-arrest statement
omitting significant fact properly used to impeach defendant's testimony at trial concerning that
fact, as defendant had waived his right to remain silent).
63. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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statement. 64 In most instances, the portion of the co-defendant's state-
ment which is inculpatory of the non-confessing defendant is simply
deleted, and the jury is instructed to consider the statement only with
respect to the person who actually made it.
A different question is presented when multiple co-defendants
make inculpatory statements which interlock, and, either implicitly or
explicitly, tie all the defendants to the crime. If the confessing defend-
ants do not testify at trial, the Seventh Circuit has treated the admission
of such interlocking statements as a Bruton violation.65
In United States v. Fleming,66 the two brothers named Fleming
made detailed interlocking admissions with respect to a bank robbery
and murder with which they and another defendant were charged. The
other defendant, Millender, on the other hand, made only a cryptic
admission when presented with a copy of the indictment, stating "I'll
tell you one thing, whoever told them all this had to be somebody that
was there because they knew exactly how it took place. ' '67 The Flem-
ing brothers' statements did not inculpate Millender, and Millender's
statement only inferentially inculpated the Flemings. None of the
three defendants testified at trial.
In evaluating the claimed Bruton error with respect to each de-
fendant, the court held that admission of the interlocking statements
was a Bruton violation. However, after evaluating all the evidence, the
court found that the admission of the interlocking admissions was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the Fleming broth-
ers' convictions.
With respect to Millender, however, it is interesting to note that
neither of the Flemings' statements were directly inculpatory in the
traditional sense. Neither of the Flemings referred to Millender as an
accomplice or suggested that he was a participant in the charged of-
fenses. As to Millender's own statement, its very ambiguity apparently
troubled the court, as they noted that a "seemingly inconsequential
statement by Millender could be interpreted by a jury to be an admis-
64. In overruling Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957), the Court recognized the
danger presented in a Brulon-type situation. Although the jury in Bruton was instructed to con-
sider the statements of the confessing non-testifying co-defendant only as evidence of that co-
defendant's guilt, the Court noted that it was unlikely that a jury could entirely disregard the
inculpatory aspect of the confession with respect to Bruton. 391 U.S. at 125.
65. The court has typically assessed this Bruton violation in the context of all the evidence
and applied the harmless error analysis. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilson v. Warden, No. 78-
1560 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 1979) (unpublished opinion); United States v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 (1972).
66. 594 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979).
67. 1d at 601.
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sion of guilt when coupled with the detailed admissions of his co-de-
fendants." 68 Mindful of the concern in Bruton that a jury will be
unable to separate the evidence of guilt with respect to each defend-
ant,69 the Seventh Circuit ordered a new trial for Millender despite the
absence of inculpatory evidence in the Flemings' admissions.
The harmless error approach of Fleming was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Parker v. Randoph,70 in which the court held that
admission of interlocking confessions is not a Bruton violation. None-
theless, the difficult question posed by Fleming survives: to what extent
may statements of co-defendants, though not directly inculpatory, be
viewed as interlocking?71
GRAND JURY
The dual function of the grand jury, investigation and accusation,
was brought into focus this term in two cases which examined conflicts
of interest in the grand jury process. In In re the Special February 1977
Grand Jury,72 the court of appeals considered the implications of di-
vided loyalty of the defense attorney; In re Perlin73 considered the im-
plications of divided loyalty of the prosecutor.
The conflict of interest problem in Special February 1977 Grand
Jury arose when a single defense attorney represented multiple wit-
nesses in connection with a grand jury investigation. Fearing that rep-
resentation by a single attorney would impede the investigation and
compromise the interests of some of the witnesses, the government
moved to disqualify the defense counsel. After an evidentiary hearing,
68. Id at 605.
69. Such concern was recently voiced by the Supreme Court:
When as in Bruton, the confessing co-defendant has chosen not to take the stand and the
implicated defendant has made no extra-judicial admission of guilt, limiting instructions
cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confronta-
tion Clause. Under such circumstances, the practical and human limitations of the jury
system override the theoretically sound premise that a jury will follow the trial courts
instructions. Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2140 (1979).
70. 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
71. This problem was anticipated in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion:
The fact that confessions may interlock to some degree does not ensure, as a per se
matter, that their admission will not prejudice a defendant so substantially that a limiting
instruction will not be curative. . . . Instead of focusing on whether the error was harm-
less, defendants and courts will be forced, instead, to inquire whether the confessions
were sufficiently interlocking so as to permit a conclusion that Bruton does not apply.
Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132, 2142 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The traditional for-
mulation of "interlocking" has been whether the statements are substantially the same, although
absolute identity is not required. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fitz, 476 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973).
72. 581 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1978).
73. 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
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the motion was denied by the district court, and the government ap-
pealed.
On appeal74 the government urged aper se rule: the existence of a
potential conflict of interest requires disqualification to insure the effec-
tive administration of criminal justice at the grand jury level. The Sev-
enth Circuit rejected this formulation, framing the test as one requiring
''a clear showing of either an actual conflict . . . or a grave danger of
such a conflict which would impede the proper functioning of the
grand jury. '75
The assessment of an actual conflict of interest, or the grave dan-
ger of one, is to be made from all the facts. For example, disqualifica-
tion has been held appropriate due to actual conflicts when defense
counsel was being paid by an organization dedicated to frustrating the
very grand jury investigation in which the defense counsel was in-
volved,76 and when defense counsel was himself the target of the grand
jury investigation. 77 Undoubtedly, one attorney may serve more than
one client,78 but not at the expense of either client's interests.7 9 In Spe-
cial February 1977 Grand Jury, the Seventh Circuit found no evidence
of an actual conflict of interest nor any grave danger of one. All the
witnesses had been advised on the record of the potential for conflict,
74. The issue of the appealability of the district court's denial of the disqualification motion
was a novel one. Prior to Special February 1977 Grand Jury, several circuit courts of appeal had
held that orders granting disqualification were appealable. No court, however, had held that a
motion denying disqualification in a grand jury investigation was an appealable order. See In re
Investigation Before the February 1977 Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1977); In re
the Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976); In re Investigation
Before the April 1975 Grand Jury, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262
(5th Cir. 1976) (all holding orders granting disqualification to be appealable). In Special February
1977 Grand Jury, the court held that the denial of the disqualification motion was an appealable
collateral order which "finally determine[d] claims of right ... collateral to [the] rights asserted in
the action, [which are] too important to be denied review . . .[or] deferred until the whole case is
adjudicated." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). Chief Judge
Fairchild, dissenting on the issue of appealability, found that in the context of a grand jury investi-
gation, the government lacked the necessary interest "to initiate a [disqualification] proceeding
against an attorney or to appeal from the decision of the court that the claim is unfounded." 581
F.2d at 1265.
75. Id.
76. Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975).
77. In re Investigation Before February 1977 Lynchburg Grand Jury, 563 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.
1977).
78. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D R 5-105(c) provides:
A lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent
the interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the
possible effect of such representation on the exercise of his independent professional
judgment on behalf of each.
79. Compare In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976) with In re the Grand Jury Em-
paneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009 (3d Cir. 1976) (joint representation of union membership
and "target" union officials).
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and all agreed to the joint representation. 80 Although two of the wit-
nesses had been granted immunity from prosecution in exchange for
testimony, the court held that in the absence of evidence that the two
immunized witnesses could incriminate the non-immunized jointly-
represented witnesses, no conflict was presented. 8'
In In re Perlin,82 the claimed conflict of interest arose from the
dual loyalty of the prosecutor, an attorney with the investigating civil
agency, who was specially appointed to assist in the criminal investiga-
tion. In 1975, the Commodities Futures Trading Commission 83 began
a civil investigation of suspected illegal transactions on the Chicago
Board of Trade. A CFTC staff attorney prepared an administrative
complaint charging violations of the Commodities Futures Trading
Act, and contemporaneously he transmitted a report to the United
States Attorney's office in Chicago recommending criminal prosecu-
tion. Because of his expertise, the agency attorney was then appointed
a Special Assistant United States Attorney to assist in the criminal in-
vestigation. During the grand jury investigation, Perlin, a trader at the
Chicago Board of Trade, was granted immunity. He refused to testify,
however, and was judged in contempt and ordered held in custody. In
challenging the contempt and commitment, Perlin argued that the
grand jury was tainted by the conflict of the CFTC agency lawyer who
also acted as prosecutor. Perlin claimed that "the agency attorney's in-
terest naturally lies in justifying the agency's recommendation that the
case be referred for prosecution. That bias . . . conflicts with the...
duty of the prosecutor to protect innocent citizens against unfounded
criminal prosecution."
In evaluating Perlin's claim, the Seventh Circuit perceived no con-
80. The Seventh Circuit specifically noted that this was an "added precaution, but [a fact] not
necessary to the instant determination." 581 F.2d at 1265. The Second Circuit has found this
agreement to proceed with multiple representation to be the critical inquiry in resolving the dis-
qualification issue. In In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977), the court noted that once
the trial court has insured that the "client . . . is fully aware of the nature of the conflict and
understands the potential threat to the protection of his interests, . . . [the court] is without power
unilaterally to obstruct the choice of counsel." See also In re the Grand Jury Empaneled January
21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1976).
81. 581 F.2d at 1265. The Third Circuit has suggested in dicta that immunity of some but not
all of a group of jointly represented witnesses could give rise to a conflict of interest. In re the
Grand Jury Empaneled January 21, 1975, 536 F.2d 1009, 1011 (3d Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit
has suggested in dicta that an immunity grant to one witness does not create a conflict as to the
other jointly represented witnesses, if all the witnesses agree to the continued joint representation.
In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir. 1977). The possibilities for conflict of interest would
seem more likely in the case of negotiated rather than "blind" immunity, however, no court has
made such a distinction.
82. 589 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1978).
83. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission is hereinafter referred to as the CFTC.
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flict in the special appointment of the agency attorney to assist in the
grand jury investigation, since the agency lawyer who recommended
prosecution was no different from any other zealous prosecutor. 84 Rec-
ognizing that a factual showing of bias by any prosecutor may invali-
date a resulting indictment, the court held that no bias is established
simply by the agency relationship.
The holding in Perlin is a narrow one, giving qualified approval to
the dual function of agency investigation and criminal prosecution by
the same attorney. The court explicitly found that there were no im-
proper disclosures of grand jury material or breaches of grand jury se-
crecy to the civil agency.85 While the agency attorney-prosecutor role
is not aper se conflict of interest, the use of agency attorneys as Special
Assistant United States Attorneys presents unique problems in grand
jury proceedings.86
The complexity of grand jury investigations and the attendant
need for administrative expertise, illustrated by Perlin, have created
unanticipated risks of improper grand j ury disclosures. Prior to August
1, 1978, the secrecy provisions of rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure governing grand jury disclosures specifically au-
thorized disclosure of "matters occurring before the grand jury" to "at-
torneys for the government for use in the performance of their
duties.' 87 Implicitly, disclosures to persons other than the government
84. United States v. Dondich, 460 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Calif. 1978). But see In re April 1977
Grand Jury Subpoenas: General Motors Corp. v. United States, 573 F.2d 936 (6th Cir.), rev'den
banc, 584 F.2d 1366 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 934 (1979) (The original panel decision
held that the dual function of an IRS staff attorney appointed to assist in a grand jury investiga-
tion initiated pursuant to his recommendation created a conflict of interest. In reversing, the court
did not reach this conflict issue, holding that denial of the disqualification motion was not appeal-
able.).
85. Perlin argued that the CFTC attorney had communicated grand jury material to his su-
pervisor in the CFTC. The Seventh Circuit noted that these disclosures were made pursuant to a
rule 6(e) disclosure order, and, consequently, the CFTC supervisor was equally bound by the
grand jury secrecy provisions. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 6(e)(2)(B). Certainly, a criminal grand jury
investigation cannot be used as a ploy to "elicit evidence [for] a civil case" and grand jury material
cannot be used by the civil agency in connection with the civil proceedings. United States v.
Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). In re Special March 1974 Grand Jury, 541 F.2d 166
(7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977).
86. In United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979), these problems were under-
scored when the agency attorney/prosecutor testified before the investigating grand jury. In dis-
missing the indictment for grand jury abuse by the agency attorney/prosecutor, the court noted
that despite the complexity of many criminal investigations, the risks of unauthorized grand jury
disclosures cautions against the use of agency attorneys as Special Assistant United States Attor-
neys.
87. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(A) provided:
Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its deliberations and the
vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for use in the per-
formance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator
of a recording device, or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose
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attorney required an order of court. Rule 6(e) was amended, effective
August 1, 1978, to permit the attorney for the government to avail him-
self of the expertise of various governmental agents in the course of the
grand jury investigation, authorizing disclosures to "such government
personnel as are deemed necessary . . . to assist . . .[in the enforce-
ment] of federal criminal law."' 88 The amended rule, however, requires
that a record of the government personnel who have been given access
to the grand jury materials be filed with the court.89
In United States v. Stanford,90 the Seventh Circuit examined the
former rule 6(e) secrecy provisions as they governed the disposition of
the issues in the case. Stanford was one of more than ninety defendants
indicted separately after a massive investigation of welfare fraud. Be-
cause of the complex nature of the employment and welfare documents
gathered, personnel from the Illinois Department of Public Aid were
used to determine the scope of the fraud. The personnel were made
special agents of the investigating grand jury, and appropriate disclo-
sure orders were entered by the court in conformity with the former
rule 6(e). 9 1 Federal Bureau of Investigation personnel, including ac-
counting technicians and agents, were also made special agents of the
grand jury and advised of the secrecy requirements for purposes of the
investigation. No disclosure orders were obtained to permit these FBI
personnel access to the "matters occurring before the grand jury" and
the defendants claimed on appeal that the disclosures were in violation
of former rule 6(e). The Seventh Circuit, noting that the new rule 6(e)
matters [occurring before the grand jury] only when so directed by the court prelimina-
rily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the
request of the defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss
the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of
secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule. The court
may direct that an indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has
given bail, and in that event the clerk shall seal the indictment and no person shall
disclose the finding of the indictment except when necessary for the issuance and execu-
tion of a warrant or summons.
88. The amended Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2)(A) provides, in pertinent part:
Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury
...may be made to-..
(ii) such government personnel as are deemed necessary by an attorney for the govern-
ment to assist an attorney for the government in the performance of such attorney's duty
to enforce Federal Criminal Law.
89. The amended rule 6(e)(2)(B) provides in pertinent part:
An attorney for the government shall promptly provide the district court before which
was empaneled the grand jury whose material has been so disclosed, with the names of
the persons to whom such disclosure has been made.
90. 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978).
9 1. The Stanford defendants also challenged the scope of the disclosure orders obtained to
permit disclosure to the personnel. Although the court noted that disclosure orders should state
with particularity the appropriate persons to whom disclosure will be made, the challenged disclo-
sure orders were not held improper by the court. Id. at 291.
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specifically permits such disclosures without court order, determined
that the disclosures were also proper under the prior rule 6(e). The
court reasoned that the term "attorney for the government" 92 in the
former rule was broad enough to encompass FBI personnel. In light of
the specific language of the new rule, this reading of the old provision is
questionable. Implicit in the court's resolution of this issue, however,
was a recognition that the FBI personnel, as grand jury agents, were
aware of the secrecy requirements of the grand jury, and failure to ob-
tain a court order in conformity with a now abandoned rule did not
taint the investigation.
The Stanford defendants claimed another rule 6(e) secrecy breach
in that employment and welfare documents subpoenaed by the grand
jury were shown to the defendants. During interviews with the defend-
ants, each defendant was shown his own employment file and welfare
records. No rule 6(e) disclosure order had been obtained. This disclo-
sure of subpoenaed documents to the defendants, without the authority
of a disclosure order, presented an interesting issue not addressed in the
present rule 6(e), which governs disclosure to government personnel.
In evaluating the claim, the Seventh Circuit found that "matters occur-
ring before the grand jury" were not disclosed, as the documents shown
to the individual defendants did not reveal the grand jury investigation.
The documents had a significance totally apart from their status as sub-
poenaed grand jury material, thus the grand jury secrecy shield did not
adhere to them in contexts outside the grand jury investigation.93 As
each defendant had a legitimate interest in documents which had in-
dependent significance, 94 and as the disclosures "revealed nothing of
the grand jury investigation, '95 the disclosures were not subject to the
strictures of rule 6(e). 96
The unlimited scope of the investigatory and accusatory power of
92. The court relied on Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 54(c) to interpret "attorney for
the government":
"Attorney for the government" means the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of
the Attorney General, a United States Attorney, an authorized assistant of a United
States Attorney and when applicable to cases arising under the laws of Guam means the
Attorney General of Guam or such other persons as may be authorized by the laws of
Guam to act therein.
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 54(c).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Interstate Dress Carriers, 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960).
94. 589 F.2d at 291. See United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975).
95. 589 F.2d at 291.
96. Where documents are significant simply because of their grand jury status, and disclosure
of the documents would amount to disclosure of the grand jury investigation, they are "matters
occurring before the grand jury" for disclosure purposes. See Corona Constr. Co. v. Ampress
Brick Co., 376 F. Supp. 598 (N.D. 111. 1974).
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the grand jury may prompt some re-evaluation of the traditional con-
cepts which give the prosecutor unfettered control.97 While such devel-
opments may well be desirable, they may arise from legislative rather
than judicial sources. 98 The only evidence of a shift in review of grand
jury issues in the Seventh Circuit this term is found in decisions permit-
ting appeal of grand jury matters. 99
THE GOVERNMENT'S OBLIGATIONS IN THE CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY PROCESS
In most respects, criminal pre-trial discovery is a well codified area
of the law. 00 The need to specifically define the statutory terms occa-
sionally arises, '0 ' but the focal point of criminal discovery is the obliga-
tion of the prosecution with respect to evidence which is favorable to
the defendant. The due process formulation of that prosecutorial re-
sponsibility is set forth in Brady v. Maryland.0 2 However, the precept
that favorable evidence bearing on guilt or punishment must be dis-
closed to the defense is not susceptible to easy resolution. The critical
97. For example, the Supreme Court has declined to hold that Miranda warnings must be
given to grand jury subjects. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); United States v.
Edelson, 581 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). These warnings are
required by Justice Department guidelines. However, a violation of these guidelines does not per
se render the grand jury statements inadmissible. Compare United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741
(1979) with United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978).
98. This term, the Seventh Circuit disapproved the selective recordation of testimony before
the grand jury, however, the court refused to reverse based on the failure to record the FBI agents'
statements to the grand jury. United States v. D'Andrea, 585 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979). This has been changed by recent legislation requiring recordation of
all grand jury testimony. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(1) (amended August I, 1979).
99. See In re the Special April 1977 Grand Jury, Appeal of William Scott, 587 F.2d 889 (7th
Cir. 1978); In re the Special April 1977 Grand Jury, Appeal of William Scott, 581 F.2d 589 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978) (considering appeal of denial of motion to quash subpoe-
nas).
100. For example, United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Local Rule
2.04, which parallels the discovery required by rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, specifically outlines those matters which must be produced for the defendant promptly after
arraignment.
101. For example, during the past term the court has examined two aspects of the Jencks Act,
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1979), which requires production of statements by government witnesses prior
to cross-examination. In United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'don other
grounds, 439 U.S. 1066 (1979), the court adhered to its holding in United States v. Harris, 542
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934 (1977), that a government agent's destruction
of rough notes which have been incorporated into a written report is not a Jencks Act violation
requiring that the agent's testimony be stricken. But see United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247
(9th Cir. 1976) (destruction of agent's handwritten notes Jencks Act violation). In United States v.
Fearns, 589 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir. 1978), the court adhered to its earlier holding in United States v.
Callahan, 534 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976), that statements of government
witnesses which also incorporate oral statements of the defendant are exempted from rule 16 pre-
trial discovery by the Jencks Act. See also United States v. Feinberg, 502 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975).
102. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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question in evaluating the applicability of Brady principles is often
framed in terms of prejudice. Where that prejudice cannot be ascer-
tained from the appellate record, as, for example, where government
concealment that a co-defendant was also a government informer may
have compromised the defense, a hearing is required to gauge the pos-
sible prejudice from government nondisclosure. 10 3 Brady is an after-
the-fact evaluation of concealed evidence which has no applicability to
newly discovered evidence not known to the prosecutor prior to or dur-
ing trial. 1°4 Typically, it is an analysis which must be made without
regard to the intentions of the prosecutor. 05
In United States v. McPartlin,0 6 the Seventh Circuit unequivo-
cally stated that Brady is a test of concealment which does not apply to
the disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense during the course of
trial. Brady tests the constitutionality of a conviction obtained by non-
disclosure of favorable evidence; disclosure of favorable evidence prior
to conviction renders Brady inapplicable. The government in
McPartlin had provided the defense with detailed financial informa-
tion with respect to the chief government witness prior to trial. In the
opening statement for the government, it was disclosed that the chief
government witness had retained a share of the money given him by
one group of defendants to pay bribes to the other defendants. There-
after, that witness' grand jury testimony and reports of interviews in
which he admitted the embezzlement rather than bribery, were given to
the defense. The court held Brady inapplicable to the early trial disclo-
sures in McPartlin, noting that "[d]ue process, albeit requiring eventual
disclosure, does not require that in all instances this disclosure must
occur before trial."'' 0 7 The court posited the analysis as one testing
103. United States v. Disston, 582 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1978) (reversing district court denial of
motion for new trial without evidentiary hearing).
104. United States v. Gabriel, 597 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1979).
105. "[Tlhe suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). See
United States v. Disston, 582 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1978), suggesting that the good or bad faith of
the prosecutor may bear on the determination of the materiality of the nondisclosed evidence.
The court of appeals in Disston further noted that the standard for determining materiality differs
depending on whether a specific or non-specific discovery request was made. United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106, 112 (1976).
106. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979).
107. Id at 1346. "It seems clear that the essential unfairness found by the court in the Brady
setting is directly bound up with the fact of suppression-that is some act or failure to act on the
part of the prosecution which renders material exculpatory evidence unavailable to the accused.
Indeed in this element of suppression lies the constitutional basis for distinguishing Brady mate-
rial from all other kinds of newly discovered evidence." United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d
1199, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
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whether the disclosure came "so late as to prevent defendant from re-
ceiving a fair trial." 0 8 Despite the due process framework in which the
court evaluated the defendant's claim, the underlying determination
was premised on the fact that the defendants "barely developed before
this court any specific ways in which they were prejudiced by this delay
. . . and their. . . failure to request additional time for. . . investiga-
tion . . . thoroughly discredits their assertion that they were prejudiced
by the timing of the disclosure."'' 0 9
The defendants in McPartlin had urged in briefs and arguments
that regardless of the Brady implications of the late disclosure, the gov-
ernment's failure to obey a specific order of the district judge to pro-
duce that favorable material required reversal. The Seventh Circuit
did not address this issue in the McPartlin opinion, presumably defer-
ring to the discretion of the district judge for the imposition of sanc-
tions for failure to comply with discovery orders.110
The issue of late disclosure of arguably favorable evidence was
examined by the court this term in the context of civil litigation in
Hampton v. Hanrahan.' In Hampton, the survivors of the so-called
"Black Panther Raid" of 1969 sought damages for alleged violations of
civil rights by local and federal officials. The civil discovery was pro-
tracted, and considerable evidence from files of the federal defendants
first came to light during the course of the trial. In evaluating the
charges of untimely disclosure, the court of appeals noted that "[t]he
delay of the federal defendants in meeting their obligations to produce
relevant documentary material would supply a basis for an inference
that plaintiffs were unable to present all the available evidence and
thus were denied the opportunity to prove their case."' 12
108. 595 F.2d at 1346. In United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d at 281 (7th Cir. 1979), a similar
issue was presented and the court again "reiterat[ed] that Brady does not require pretrial disclo-
sure. As long as ultimate disclosure is made before it is too late for the defendants to make use of
any benefits of the evidence, due process is satisfied." Id at 291.
109. 595 F.2d at 1346-47. The McPardin defendants suggested that the delayed disclosure of
the evidence limited their ability to investigate and find other derivative evidence favorable to the
defense. Characterizing the claims as non-specific and conclusory, the court rejected the argu-
ment. See also United States v. Hooper, 596 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1979) (the court evaluated a Brady
claim in the context of availability of the information at trial and defense counsel's failure to
maximize the favorable information).
110. Although the district judge found that a technical violation of the pretrial discovery order
had occurred, the court ruled that in the absence of any demonstrable prejudice to the defendants,
no sanctions were appropriate.
111. 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. Id at 642. The court also found that the late disclosure was in violation of the pretrial
discovery orders, and suggested that sanctions were appropriate. The district court had made no
specific finding on this issue of violation of the pretrial discovery orders, and the district judge had
not imposed sanctions on the federal defendants.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The documents produced in Hampton were also the subject of a
Brady claim in United States v. Robinson.' 3 Robinson was convicted
in 1973 of criminal civil rights violations and kidnapping resulting in
murder. Documents produced in Hampton included sixteen bound
volumes (over 10,000 pages) of FBI reports regarding William O'Neill,
a member of the Black Panther Party, and the chief government wit-
ness against Robinson at trial. The Hampton documents came to light
after Robinson's conviction, and in his motion for a new trial," 4
Robinson asserted that the prosecutor had withheld the O'Neill
volumes in violation of section 3500 and the Brady mandate. The dis-
trict court found that the claim was "mere speculation" and refused to
review the O'Neill documents in camera. On appeal, Robinson urged
that the district judge's finding that the documents were irrelevant,
without reviewing the documents in issue, was error which entitled
Robinson to a hearing on his motion for a new trial. The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court finding, stating that it is:
simply impossible for a court to rule on an alleged Brady violation
unless a defendant identifies with reasonable particularity the evi-
dence to be considered. Furthermore, to allow rummaging through
government files under the authority of Brady would be to defeat the
stated legislative intent of the Jencks Act and therefore cannot be
allowed. ' 15
In United States v. Calzada,1 6 the court examined the obligations
of the government with respect to preserving evidence of a crime, and
although the case is of limited precedential value, it is nonetheless a
significant departure from the cases previously discussed. Calzada is of
limited precedential value as it addresses an uncommon factual cir-
cumstance in holding that deportation of material witnesses prior to
affording the defense an opportunity to interview them requires dismis-
sal of the indictment. Calzada is significant in that it reaches this con-
clusion without regard for the intentions of the prosecutor or the
prejudice to the defendant.
Calzada and seven others were charged with violations of United
States immigration laws, including illegal transportation of aliens from
Arizona to Illinois. The defendants and thirteen illegally transported
aliens were arrested" 17 in late April and early May 1977. Shortly there-
113. 585 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979).
114. See text accompanying notes 371-77 infra for a discussion of Robinson's motion for a
new trial.
115. 585 F.2d at 281.
116. 579 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 920 (1978).
117. The majority opinion cryptically refers to the defendant's arrests, 579 F.2d at 1363 n.10,
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after, two of the arrested aliens were released and permitted to return to
Mexico as they were juveniles. 1 8 On May 29, 1977, the government
deported three of the arrested aliens, and thereafter released two more
arrested aliens who then left the United States. Calzada and the other
defendants were indicted on June 30, 1977, and charged with transport-
ing and concealing the six arrested aliens who were still in the United
States. Calzada and the other defendants filed motions to dismiss con-
tending that the government action in deporting witnesses to the
charged offense violated their right to compulsory process. The district
court concurred, and dismissed the indictment without holding an evi-
dentiary hearing.
On appeal, the government argued that in the absence of evidence
of bad faith or evidence that the testimony of the deported witnesses
would be favorable to the defense, the dismissal was improper. The
government suggested that the case was analogous to United States v.
Perlman,'19 in which a co-conspirator in the sale of narcotics was de-
ported prior to the defendant's trial. The defendant was tried and
found guilty. On review of that conviction, the Seventh Circuit de-
clined to reverse since the defendant could show neither prejudice nor
prosecutorial bad faith. 20 In Calzada, the court noted that the Perl-
man panel had disapproved the deportation procedure but found that
the error was harmless. Calzada distinguished Perlman by suggesting
that, prior to 1970, the government had no warning that deportation of
witnesses would be judicially disapproved, thus no sanctions were ap-
propriate. The court reasoned that since the Perlman decision, the gov-
ernment has "been on notice that this court does not approve the
practice of deporting material witnesses prior to giving a defendant an
opportunity to interview them,"' 2' thus dismissal of Calzada's indict-
ment was proper.
As there was no bad faith, Calzada was not dismissed on the basis
of government misconduct; as there was no exculpatory material,
Calzada was not dismissed on the basis of Brady violations. Rather,
the court premised its decision on the right to compulsory process:
"[T]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses and compel their attend-
ance if necessary . . . in plain terms the right to present a defense, the
however, the dissenting opinion clarifies that seven of the eight defendants were arrested in late
April and early May of 1977. Id. at 1364 n.5.
118. The court found no impropriety in the release of the juvenile alien witnesses, citing
United States v. Carrillo-Frausto, 500 F.2d 234, 235 (7th Cir. 1974).
119. 430 F.2d 22 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970).
120. 579 F.2d at 1362.
121. Id
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right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prose-
cution's . . . so that the Uuryl may decide where the truth lies."' 22 Re-
lying on Washington v. Texas,' 23 the court held that deportation of
these alien witnesses violated the sixth amendment guarantee to pro-
duce witnesses on one's own behalf. 124
The dissent in Calzada urged that any evaluation of missing evi-
dence is essentially an inquiry for prejudice. As the defendants could
not in any way suggest that the deported aliens would testify favorably
or furnish exculpatory evidence, dismissal was inappropriate. 125 With-
out any evidence of prejudice or even due diligence in attempting to
preserve their rights, the defendants won "fortuitous freedom from
prosecution . . . [by] the government's inadvertent error."'' 26
In a related area, the court examined the conduct of the prosecu-
tion in generating prejudicial pre-trial publicity in United States v.
Stanford.'27 Stanford was charged with welfare fraud contemporane-
ously with ninety-one other defendants, and substantial pre-trial pub-
licity was generated by the United States Attorney's office. In
evaluating Stanford's claim, the Seventh Circuit noted that misconduct
does not "exist in a vacuum,"'' 28 and as none of the defendants had
requested jury trials to gauge the extent of the prejudice from the pub-
licity, the publicity alone could not be a basis for reversal. The court
disapproved the extensive publicity, finding it violative of the Depart-
ment of Justice regulations. However, the court correctly noted that
violation of an internal regulation does not give rise to a constitutional
claim. 129
122. Id at 1360, citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
123. Washington invalidated a Texas statute which prohibited an accomplice from testifying
on behalf of the defendant but not on behalf of the prosecution. The court also relied on United
States v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450
F.2d I (9th Cir. 1971), in which witnesses were deported before the defendants were made aware
of the investigations. The dissent factually distinguished Calzada from these two Ninth Circuit
cases, as the Calzada defendants had one month to investigate the charges after their arrests but
before the deportation. The first request to interview aliens was made several weeks after the
return of the indictment. 579 F.2d at 1363.
124. See United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612, 616 (7th Cir. 1978) (no error in denial of
defendant's rule 17(b) request to subpoena witness at government expense where said witness'
testimony was arguably cumulative).
125. See also the dissenting opinion in United States v. Mendez-Rodriguez, 450 F.2d 1, 6 (9th
Cir. 1971) (Kilkenny, J., dissenting).
126. 579 F.2d at 1364.
127. 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979).
128. 589 F.2d at 299.
129. This holding that violation of internal regulations is not a violation of due process has
since been confirmed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
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THE USE OF MAGISTRATES IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
In United States v. Guerrero-Herrera,30 and United States v. Rad-
datz,131 the Seventh Circuit examined the due process implications of
separating the observation of witnesses and the decision making proc-
ess. In Guerrero-Herrera, evidence on a motion to suppress a post-ar-
rest statement was heard by the district judge to whom the case was
then assigned. Prior to ruling on the pending motion, the judge who
had heard the evidence and observed that the witnesses had died. The
case was reassigned to another district court judge who proposed mak-
ing his decision on the transcript of the hearing and the briefs filed by
the parties. Guerrero-Herrera's attorney did not object to that proce-
dure at the time it was proposed by the judge, but later, in one of the
briefs, suggested that the transcript "may be insufficient"'' 32 as the
judge then deciding the case had not observed the demeanor of the
witnesses. The Seventh Circuit found no due process violation in this
procedure and concluded that Guerrero-Herrera was bound by his fail-
ure to raise a timely objection. In evaluating the due process claim, the
court noted that "waiver of his claim to a rehearing is implicit in his
stipulation, even assuming that the right to such a rehearing exists. Nor
can it be said that the procedure adversely affected substantial rights of
the defendant and thereby undermined the integrity of the judicial
process." 133
Six weeks after the decision in Guerrero-Herrera, the Seventh Cir-
cuit held in United States '. Raddatz, that due process requires that
"the responsibility for the hearing and the decision must be vested in
the same judge in a criminal case where credibility is essential."' 134 In
Raddatz, the court considered the constitutionality of the procedure
whereby hearings on motions to suppress are referred to magistrates
pursuant to the Magistrate's Act.135 The Act provides that a magistrate
shall submit written findings and -conclusions to the district judge, and
if objections to the findings are made by the parties in a timely manner,
the district judge must make a de novo determination of the contested
facts. Raddatz' motion to suppress his pre-indictment statements was
referred to a magistrate for a hearing and, after evaluating the credibil-
130. 590 F.2d 238 (7th Cir. 1978).
131. 592 F.2d 239, 976 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 44 (1979).
132. 590 F.2d at 239.
133. Id. at 241.
134. 592 F.2d at 984.
135. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (1979) (legislatively overruling Wingo v. Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974)
which precluded referral of motions to suppress to magistrates).
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ity of the witnesses, the magistrate submitted findings to the district
judge that the statements were made voluntarily. Raddatz filed objec-
tions to these proposed findings, 36 and the district judge made a de
novo determination of the contested facts based on the written tran-
script of the hearing, the findings of the magistrate, the objections to
the findings, and the written briefs of the parties. The district judge
heard no live testimony, and denied the motion to suppress, finding
that the statements had been made by Raddatz voluntarily. The Sev-
enth Circuit held that the failure of the district judge to conduct a de
novo hearing, receiving testimony and evaluating the credibility of wit-
nesses, violated Raddatz' right to due process. 37
Raddatz holds that due process includes the right to require re-
hearing of evidence by the factfinder where credibility is an issue, a
position somewhat inconsistent with the equivocal language of Guer-
rero-Herrera.38 Guerrero-Herrera had implicitly consented to the
written record procedure while Raddatz had filed objections to the
magistrate's findings.139 If evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses
by the decision maker is a component of due process, subject, as are all
rights, to waiver by the defendant, the issue which remains to be re-
solved is the extent to which a defendant must be advised of that due
process right for the waiver to be valid. 40
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
Defendants currently enjoy a three-pronged claim to a speedy trial
under the sixth amendment, the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, and the Speedy Trial Act of 1974.14' The Act departs slightly
from its constitutional predecessors in characterizing the right to a
speedy trial as being in "the best interest of the public and the defend-
ant . . . ," explicitly asserting a balancing of interests that was previ-
136. It is unclear whether Raddatz had specifically requested rehearing of evidence by the
district judge after the magistrate's findings were submitted, or had simply objected to the magis-
trate's findings.
137. The court was also presented with the argument that the referral procedure violated arti-
cle Ill of the Constitution, but declined to premise its decision on that basis. 592 F.2d at 982.
138. It is arguable that credibility of witnesses is an issue in nearly all motions to suppress.
For example, the court in Guerrero-Herrera evaluated the relative credibility of the witnesses. 590
F.2d at 242.
139. The court in Raddatz specifically noted that, "[a] number of courts have upheld refer-
ences to a magistrate when done with the consent of the parties." 592 F.2d at 983 n.9. The au-
thorities cited in support of this premise were not criminal cases.
140. The court found Guerrero-Herrera's waiver to be implicit in the stipulation to the proce-
dure. But see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
141. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1979).
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ously only inferred. 142
The leading sixth amendment case is Barker v. Wingo. 143 Barker
held that four factors must be considered in determining whether a de-
fendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated: (1) length of delay;
(2) reasons for delay; (3) whether defendant asserted that right; and, (4)
whether defendant suffered any prejudice from the delay.'nn The Court
noted that the right to a speedy trial is not violated by the passage of
any specific period of time, mandating consideration of these factors on
a case-by-case basis. Failure to pass the Barker balancing test warrants
dismissal of the indictment.
The mechanics of applying Barker are illustrated in Jones v. Mor-
ris.145 Consideration of the first three factors of the Barker test re-
sulted in an even balance in Jones. The court looked first to the length
of delay 46 and found that the twenty-three month period was not so
"inordinately lengthy" as to weigh heavily against the state.147 As to
the reason for the delay, the court noted that while defendant failed to
allege any tactical delay or bad faith on the part of the prosecution, the
"absence of any reason for the delay should weigh heavily against the
State." 14
In examining the third factor, whether the defendant asserted the
right to a speedy trial, the court considered the manner in which that
right was asserted. 149 Since the defendant had obtained a continuance
one month before filing his motion to dismiss, and trial was held less
than ten days after he asserted his sixth amendment right, the court
noted that "although Jones did not waive his speedy trial right, he was
not overly anxious to assert it and did not pursue it vigorously." 50
Because the lack of inordinate delay, the lack of proof of bad faith
142. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1979).
143. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
144. Id at 531-32.
145. 590 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979). Defendant petitioned for fed-
eral habeas corpus while serving a state murder sentence, alleging inter alia that the twenty-three
month delay between his arrest and trial constituted a violation of his sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial. Part of this delay resulted from the dismissal and subsequent reinstatement of the
murder indictment.
146. United States v. Wentland, 582 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133
(1979), held that a court must first consider whether the length of delay is "presumptively prejudi-
cial" before considering the other Barker factors. If the delay is not so found, dismissal of the
indictment is not required. See also United States v. Kilrain, 566 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 819 (1978).
147. See also Morris v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
148. 590 F.2d at 686.
149. Id, quoting Morris v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1391 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925
(1975).
150. 590 F.2d at 686.
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and the weak assertion of the right to a speedy trial, the burden of
proving a sufficient causal relationship between the delay and any
prejudice suffered thereby rested on the defendant.151 The court found
defendant's argument that the delay had caused him to misplace the
address of a witness unpersuasive.' 52
The essense of a speedy trial claim under the due process clause of
the fifth amendment is (1) a delay, (2) resulting in actual prejudice to
the defendant, (3) where such delay was intentionally caused by the
prosecution in bad faith, recklessly, or in order to gain tactical delay. 53
The approach was refined in United States v. King.154
Under United States v. Marion,5 5 a defendant must prove actual
prejudice resulting from the delay. The Court distinguished actual
prejudice from possible prejudice, the latter being guarded against by
any applicable statute of limitations. In Marion, the Supreme Court
held that in order to invoke the sixth amendment's protection, an indi-
vidual must be arrested, indicted, or otherwise charged with an offense;
its protection does not extend prior to the time of accusation.
A showing of actual prejudice, however, does not automatically
validate a defendant's claim. As the Supreme Court pointed out in
United States v. Lovasco: "Marion makes clear that proof of prejudice
is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process
claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for
the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused."' 156 This determina-
tion is to be made on a case-by-case basis. 157 Moreover, a certain
amount of prejudice to the defendant (resulting from the delay) may be
acceptable. 5 8
In United States v. D'Andrea, 59 the defendants claimed that a pre-
indictment delay prejudiced their defense by causing the unavailability
of some witnesses and the inability of others (due to fading recollec-
151. Id. at 687.
152. United States v. Gandara, 586 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1978), also employed the Barker sixth
amendment test. The length of delay was considerably less than in Jones, lasting 133 days be-
tween arrest and trial on charges of distributing heroin. Moreover, defendant failed to make any
specific assertions of how the delay impaired his defense. The length of delay and, as in Jones, the
defendant's failure to prove a sufficient causal relationship between the delay and the asserted
prejudice proved to be "dispositive" of the speedy trial issue.
153. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977); United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
154. 593 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1979); see text accompanying notes 162-65 infra.
155. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
156. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
157. Id at 796-97; United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971).
158. 431 U.S. at 796.
159. 585 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1978).
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tion) to testify competently. The court of appeals held that the defend-
ants, in failing to "identify any substantial way in which this
unavailable testimony would have aided their cause," did not meet
their burden of proving actual prejudice. 60 Neither was there a show-
ing of any intentional tactical delay on the part of the government. The
court thus concluded that the period of delay was not so "unreasonable
and prejudicial" as to require dismissal.' 6 1
In United States v. King, 62 the Seventh Circuit refined the due
process inquiry. The court stated that after a showing by the defendant
of actual prejudice resulting from delay, the burden of proof shifts to
the government to show why the delay was necessary. It is then "up to
the court to balance the reasons asserted by the Government against
the prejudice asserted by the defendant."' 63 This balance is to be made
on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with Marion and Lovasco. 164
This constitutes a substantial expansion of the prior policy of re-
quiring the defendant to demonstrate some sort of bad faith or tactical
delay on the part of the government. King places an affirmative duty
on the government to provide justification for delay, at least at the pre-
indictment stage.
Congress has recently addressed the question of the time within
which a criminal prosecution must be brought. The Speedy Trial Act
of 1974 attempts to combine substantive judicial flexibility with strict
procedural time limits, in order to ensure the prompt disposition of
criminal cases. 165 In so doing, it may have generated as many time
consuming problems as it purports to have cured. The Act disavows
any claim of being a conclusive interpretation of the sixth amendment
right to a speedy trial, 66 creating independent grounds for a speedy
trial claim for both the defendant and the public. 167 The Act applies to
all federal criminal offenses, with the exception of petty offenses, of-
fenses triable by military tribunal, and (in the Northern District of Illi-
160. Id. at 1356.
161. Id at 1357. Judge Swygert, dissenting in D'Andrea, noted that the government's only
explanation for the pre-indictment delay was the death of the FBI agent in charge of the investiga-
tion, and that the trial court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to
dismiss for pre-indictment delay was a denial of due process under Marion and Lovasco. The
delay was nearly five years--only two months short of the applicable "statute of limitations." Id
at 1363 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
162. 593 F.2d 269 (7th Cir. 1979).
163. Id at 272.
164. Id at 272 n.3.
165. See [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7401-14.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1979).
167. Id. § 3161(h)(8).
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nois) proceedings under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.' 68
Subsections (b), (c), (f) and (g) contain the basic timetable for
processing a criminal case from arrest through trial. Subsections (f)
and (g) contain a pre-July 1, 1979 "phase-in" timetable, 169 which was
subject to modification by individual district courts. 70 Dismissal of the
indictment for violations of the Act, prior to July 1, 1979, was neither
authorized nor recommended. '7 Subsections (b) and (c) provide that
where there has been an arrest, after July 1, 1979, the return of an in-
dictment or information must follow within 30 days. 72
The Speedy Trial Act of 1979, effective August 2, 1979, provides
that trial shall commence within seventy days of the filing date and
publication of the indictment. Unless the defendant consents in writ-
ing, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date the
defendant first appears through counsel or waives counsel.
Subsection 3161(h)(1)(8) sets forth proceedings concerning the de-
fendant which are not to be considered in determining whether there
has been compliance with subsections (b) and (c). These categories,
also amended by the Speedy Trial Act of 1979, are known as "excluda-
ble time" and include examination of the defendant for mental incom-
petency or physical incapacity; 73 trials with respect to other charges
against defendant; 74 and periods, not to exceed thirty days, when the
court has any motion concerning defendant under advisement, 7 and
others.
Subsection 3161(h)(8) provides for the exclusion of delay resulting
from the court's granting of a continuance, on the court's or counsel's
motion. This is a device which Congress intended to be used spar-
ingly. 176 In considering whether to grant such a continuance, the court
168. Id. § 3161(a): Northern District Plan for the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases § I(a)
[hereinafter cited as the Northern District Plan] (a copy of the Northern District Plan is on file at
the Office of the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois).
169. Prior to July 1, 1979, under section 3164, a distinction existed between priority and non-
priority defendants. Priority defendants were either those in custody or those not in custody who
have been designated by the government as high risk. Priority defendants were required to be
brought to trial no later than ninety days following detention or high risk designation. Under
section 3164(c), no detainee could be held in custody after the ninetieth day.
170. For example, the Northern District of Illinois promulgated an interim plan which short-
ened the (0 and (g) requirements.
171. See United States v. Gandara, 586 F.2d 1156. 1161 (7th Cir. 1978).
172. The Northern District of Illinois has applied for and been granted a suspension of the
time limits of subsections (b) and (c), as set forth in section 3174. This suspension is effective until
June 30, 1980. See text accompanying notes 183-87 infra.
173. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(I)(A) (1979).
174. Id. § 3161(h)(l)(D).
175. Id. § 3161(h)(l)(G).
176. See [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7426.
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must employ a balancing test to determine if "the ends of justice...
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial." 177 Four factors must be considered "among others" in weighing
this balance. They are: (1) the impact of not granting a continuance
upon the proceedings or upon justice; (2) the nature of the case in rela-
tion to the amount of time needed for adequate preparation; (3) the
complexity of the grand jury's fact-finding task, including the impact of
events which are beyond the court's or the government's control; and,
(4) in cases that do not meet the criteria of (2), but in which additional
time is needed to insure effective preparation.1 78 "General congestion
of the court's calendar, or lack of diligent preparation or failure to ob-
tain available witnesses on the part of the attorney for the government
. . . are statutorily unacceptable reasons for granting this "ends of
justice" continuance. 179
Under the 1979 amendment, the dismissal sanctions of section
3162 take effect on July 1, 1980. Under this section, dismissal may be
invoked in two ways. Subsection (a)(1) provides for the dismissal of
charges for which no indictment is filed within thirty days (plus any
applicable exclusions) of arrest. Dismissal under subsection (a)(l) is
mandatory and automatic, i.e., defendant is not required to file a mo-
tion to dismiss.
Subsection (a)(2) provides for dismissal of the indictment if de-
fendant is not brought to trial within sixty days (plus any applicable
exclusions) from the date of arraignment. Dismissal under (a)(2) is
mandatory but not automatic; defendant must file a motion to dismiss.
Subsection (a)(2) specifically provides that "[flailure of the defendant
to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal under this
section." Thus, the burden of proof is placed on the defendant in a
motion to dismiss for lack of timely trial. At the same time, there is no
need to show that the delay was prejudicial, as is necessary for a dis-
missal on sixth amendment and due process grounds.' 80 The govern-
ment then has the burden of proving excludable time.
Under either subsection, the court has discretion to dismiss the
case with or without prejudice. The essential criteria under each sub-
section are the same: (1) seriousness of the offense; (2) facts and cir-
cumstances leading to dismissal; and, (3) impact of reprosecution on
177. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1979).
178. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(i)-(iv).
179. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(C).
180. Russ & Mandelkern, Speedy TrialAct, 2 NAT. J. CRIM. DEFENSE I at 26 (1976).
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administration of both the Act and justice. These factors are to be con-
sidered "among others" under both subsections. Significantly, the
House Judiciary Committee purposefully refused to include "actual
prejudice to defendant" in its list of essential factors to be considered.
Actual prejudice is relevant but is not a determinative factor. 18'
Attorney misconduct can also be penalized under the Act, pursu-
ant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with sanctions ranging
from fines to disciplinary action. 82 Section 3174 allows any district
court, in the event of a judicial emergency, to extend the period be-
tween arraignment and trial 83 to a maximum length of 180 days, with
requisite approval of the appropriate circuit judicial council and the
Judicial Council of the United States. The time limits between arrest
and indictment 84 and the dismissal sanctions' 85 are not suspendable,
nor are the time limits for detainees being held solely for the purpose of
awaiting trial. In addition, the Act's legislative history 86 supports the
conclusion that section 3174 applies only to indictments filed after the
emergency has been declared, and not to indictments pending at the
time of declaration.
A state of judicial emergency has in fact been declared for the
Northern District of Illinois.187 As of June 20, 1979, the sixty-day time
limit from arraignment to trial is extended to a maximum of 180 days.
The extension applies only to indictments filed on or after June 20, and
lasts for one year.
Neither the Act nor the Northern District Plan expressly prohibits
or provides for the defendant's waiver of his statutory right to a speedy
trial, with the exception that any defendant may choose not to move for
a dismissal under section 316 l(a)(2). Waivers have been accepted from
defendants, 88 even over defendant's later verbal recantations. 89 The
common standard of acceptability seems to be a defendant's free, vol-
untary, and knowing entry into the waiver agreement.
181. 120 CONG. REC. 41722 (1974).
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (1979).
183. Id. § 3161(c).
184. Id. § 3161(b).
185. Id. § 3162.
186. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975).
187. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2085 (1975).
188. United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182 (2d Cir. 1976).
189. United States v. Spaulding, 588 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1978).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
GUILTY PLEAS
The United States Supreme Court, in Santobello v. New York,190
recognized that plea bargains and resulting guilty pleas are a necessary
and desirable component of the criminal justice system. Santobello,
together with Boykin v. Alabama, 191 recognizes on a constitutional level
that the benefits derived from plea agreements and guilty pleas presup-
poses fairness in securing an agreement between an accused and a pros-
ecutor, and that the waiver of certain constitutional rights through the
entry of a guilty plea is not to be lightly presumed.
Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, reflects the
Supreme Court's recognition of the necessity for plea bargaining and
guilty pleas.' 92 The rule reflects Santobello's premise that considera-
190. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
191. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
192. Rule 11(e) provides:
Plea Agreement Procedure.
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defend-
ant or the defendant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward
reaching an agreement that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a
charged offense or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government will do
any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request,
for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or re-
quest shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
(2) Notice of Such Agreement. If a plea agreement has been reached by the par-
ties, the court shall, on the record, require the disclosure of the agreement in open court
or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, at the time the plea is offered. Thereupon the
court may accept or reject the agreement, or may defer its decision as to the acceptance
or rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report.
(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, the
court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the
disposition provided for in the plea agreement.
(4) Rejection of a Plea Agreement. If the court rejects the plea agreement, the
court shall, on the record, inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally
in open court or, on a showing of good cause, in camera, that the court is not bound by
the plea agreement, afford the defendant the opportunity to then withdraw his plea, and
advise the defendant that if he persists in his guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere the
disposition of the case may be less favorable to the defendant than that contemplated by
the plea agreement.
(5) Time of Plea Agreement Procedure. Except for good cause shown, notifica-
tion to the court of the existence of a plea agreement shall be given at the arraignment or
at such other time, prior to trial, as may be fixed by the court.
(6) Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements. Except as
otherwise provided in this paragraph, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a
plea of nol contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nol contendere to the crime
charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with, and relevant to,any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding
against the. person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made
in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo
contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nol contendere to the crime charged or any
other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if thestatement was made by the defendant under oath, on the ecord, and in he pr sence of
counsel.
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tions of expediency and finality are dependent upon fairness in the
process of plea agreements, and sets forth procedures that are designed
to insure that guilty pleas are, in substance, knowingly and voluntarily
entered. 193 It also recognizes plea agreement procedures and sets out
the guidelines to be followed in reaching and memorializing a plea
agreement. 94
Recent Seventh Circuit cases reflect the distinction between the
constitutional and rule 11 standards to be applied in determining the
efficacy of a guilty plea, applying rule 11 standards to cases brought on
direct appeal and constitutional principles to cases in which the pleas
were collaterally attacked. 95
United States v. Wetterlin' 96 and United States v. Fels197 both in-
volve direct appeal challenges to guilty pleas based upon violations of
rule 11 (c), which requires that the district court address the defendant
personally and determine that he understands the nature of the charge
to which the plea is offered. Wetterlin also addressed the requirements,
based on rule 11 (g) and (f), that a court not enter a judgment upon a
guilty plea without making an inquiry into the factual basis for the
plea.
Wetterlin involved a complex conspiracy charge concerning use of
the mails. At the time of the entry of the guilty plea, the court did not
describe the charge generally or explain the law of conspiracy to the
defendant. Nor did the court inquire and determine that the defendant
understood the nature of the charges. The Seventh Circuit held that,
given the complex nature of the charges, rule 11 had been violated and
the plea to the conspiracy count should be vacated. 198
The court of appeals also found that the trial court had violated
rule 1 1(f) and (g) in failing to determine, at the time of the plea,
whether there was a factual basis for the plea. 199 In so doing, it rejected
the government's argument that the factual basis could be established
at any time prior to entry of judgment, and specifically rejected the
government's argument that an intervening trial against other defend-
193. FED. R. CiM. P. lI(c), (d).
194. See note 192 supra.
195. Recently, in United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979), the Supreme Court reversed
the Sixth Circuit and held that a conviction based on a guilty plea is not subject to collateral attack
when all that can be shown is a formal violation of rule 1i. Timmreck had not been told of a
mandatory parole term.
196. 583 F.2d 346 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 1127 (1978).
197. 599 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1979).
198. 583 F.2d 355. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (mandates that a
defendant is entitled to re-plead where a court did not fully adhere to rule 11).
199. 583 F.2d at 351-53.
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ants could serve as a factual basis.200
On a second count of knowingly making material false declara-
tions, the court refused to require strict formal compliance with rule 11.
Instead it looked to the total circumstances, including the defendant's
intelligence, the fact that he was represented by counsel, and the rela-
tively uncomplicated nature of the charge.
In United States v. Fels,20 three defendants charged with narcotics
violations, pled guilty to two counts, were sentenced, and directly ap-
pealed. At the plea, the trial court had addressed the three defendants
together in advising them of the rights being waived. While this was
held an acceptable but not preferred method of satisfying the require-
ment of rule 11 (c) that the defendants be personally addressed, the trial
court had also neglected to question two of the defendants individually
as to waiver of rights. Nor were they questioned as to whether the plea
agreement was the result of force or threats, in violation of rule 1 l(a).
While the government argued that there had been substantial compli-
ance, the court of appeals took the position that the several steps omit-
ted fell far short of what is minimally required by the rule.
Consequently, they "reluctantly" concluded that the 1 (d) violations
and the failure to question the third defendant as to force or coercion,
resulted in the failure to assure the voluntariness of the plea, a violation
that goes to the very heart of the rule. 20 2 All three defendants' convic-
tions were overturned and they were allowed to replead. The court
read Wetterin20 3 as implicitly adopting the rule that on direct appeal, a
finding of noncompliance with a single provision of rule 11 mandates a
defendant to replead.
United States v. Carreon,20 4 is the third rule 11 case decided by the
Seventh Circuit this year. Unlike the two preceeding cases, Carreon
came to the court by way of collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.205
200. Id. at 352.
201. 599 F.2d 142 (7th Cir. 1979).
202. Id at 149.
203. See text accompanying notes 198-200 supra.
204. 578 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1978).
205. "28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1979) provides:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without
jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
pri saner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the
nited States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make
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Presaging Timmreck,20 6 which at that time was unreported, the court
applied standards appropriate when a plea is collaterally challenged.
That is, relief is available only for error which is jurisdictional, consti-
tutional, or which represents a "fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice." 20 7
Carreon arose from a unique situation. Pursuant to a plea agree-
ment, the defendant sought to change his plea to guilty of distribution
of heroin. The motion for change of plea was presented to a judge
other than the one who was originally assigned the case. The second
judge concluded after questioning Carreon that there was at least a fac-
tual question as to whether the defendant was not guilty by reason of
entrapment. He declined to accept the plea and continued the matter
for a hearing before the judge who had been assigned the case.
On a renewal of the guilty plea before the original judge, defend-
ant's counsel stated that he had explained all possible defenses and
Carreon still wished to plead guilty. Nothing was said about entrap-
ment. The court read the counts to Carreon and asked if he had com-
mitted "those crimes." No questions were asked about the underlying
facts before the plea was accepted.
The Seventh Circuit held that the judge was chargeable with
knowledge of what had occurred the previous day and that it was the
duty of the prosecutor and defense counsel to make sure he was fully
advised. In these circumstances, the factual basis requirement of rule
11 (f) was not satisfied. McCarthy v. United States20 8 was held to be
controlling in its insistence that the record show that the defendant un-
derstood not only the nature of the charge, but also the law in relation
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. If the court finds that the
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence imposed was not au-
thorized by law or otherwise open to collateral attack, or that there has been such a
denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judg-
ment vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside
and shall discharge the prisoner, or resentence him or grant a new trial or-correct the
sentence as may appear appropriate.
A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production
of the prisoner at the hearing.
The sentencing court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive mo-
tion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner.
An appeal may be taken in the court of appeals from the order entered on the mo-
tion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized
to appl for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it ap-
pears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which
sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
206. United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780 (1979). See note 195 supra.
207. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974), quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S.
424, 429 (1962).
208. 394 U.S. 459 (1969). See note 198 supra.
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to the facts of his case. Although McCarthy was a direct appeal, the
Seventh Circuit considered the reasoning to be equally applicable to
collateral attack where failure to establish a factual basis on the record
left open the question of voluntariness.
Aside from the rule 11 challenges, the Seventh Circuit ruled on
two cases within the past year in which it was alleged that the govern-
ment failed to honor plea agreements. 209 In United States v. Bowler,210
the plea agreement provided as follows: "The government recommen-
dations as to incarceration. . . may be reduced based upon the extent
of defendant's truthful cooperation,. . . the condition of his health and
other personal factors, and Antitrust Division guidelines which indicate
that fines may be substituted for incarceration in appropriate circum-
stances." 2t' The court held that "when a plea rests in any significant
degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, . . . such promise
must be fulfilled. '212 Since the government may always recommend a
lesser sentence, it was decided that there would be no purpose to an
agreement referring to specific factors if the agreement was not con-
strued to contain an explicit promise to consider the factors with an eye
to reducing the sentence. It was further held to be necessary that the
government's evaluation of such mitigating factors be set forth in the
sentencing record. Since the only consideration set forth in the record
was the defendant's cooperation, the sentence was vacated and the case
remanded for specific performance of the government's promise and
resentence.
ADMINISTRATION OF JURY TRIALS
The right to a trial by jury, as guaranteed by the sixth amendment,
occasionally presents problems in administration. Although the han-
dling of a criminal jury is largely left to the discretion of the district
judge, several Seventh Circuit cases this term have focused on issues
which arise with respect to conducting a jury trial.
In United States v. Scott, 2 13 the court reviewed the procedure for
209. In United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1978), the defendant had pled guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement in which the defendant would be permitted to withdraw his plea if
not placed on probation. In a novel argument, the defendant claimed that the government had
failed to honor its agreement when it subsequently moved to revoke his probation for failure to
live up to its conditions. The court held that he was not entitled to irrevocable probation under
the agreement.
210. 585 F.2d 851 (7th Cir. 1978).
211. Id at 853.
212. Id at 853, quoting Santobello v. United States, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
213. 583 F.2d 362 (7th Cir. 1978).
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waiving trial by jury. The defendant's counsel, in his presence, indi-
cated that the defendant wished to proceed by bench trial. Thereafter,
the defendant and his attorney both signed the printed jury waiver
form. No personal interrogation of the defendant appeared on the rec-
ord. The defendant contended on appeal that the record did not indi-
cate that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to trial by jury.
Relying on previous Seventh Circuit authority,214 the court of appeals
affirmed the conviction, but specifically noted that "the better practice
is to interrogate defendants on the subject of their understanding of the
right to a jury trial and waiver [of that right]. '' 215 The court, pursuant
to its supervisory powers, implemented a rule of procedure analogous
to rule 11 guilty pleas, requiring personal inquiry into a defendant's
understanding of the right to trial by jury and waiver of that right. 21 6
The sixth amendment assurance of trial by an impartial jury, nec-
essarily implies the right to voir dire prospective jurors on their fairness
and qualifications. While certain cases may require special inquiry (for
example, racial prejudice or pretrial publicity), the defendant has no
right to demand that specific questions be asked in a specific manner.217
Similarly, despite requests from the parties, the district judge need not
make specific inquiry into prior jury service. 21 8 Once the jury has been
empaneled, the judge may exercise sound discretion in excusing a juror
for tardiness 21 9 or in permitting the jury to separate during delibera-
tions.220
In two cases during the past term, the court considered allegations
of jury misconduct and the procedures utilized by the district courts in
investigating the claimed impropriety. The procedures used by the dis-
214. United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 872 (1977);
Estrada v. United States, 457 F.2d 255 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 858 (1972).
215. 583 F.2d at 364. In referring to personal interrogation as the better practice, the court
specifically noted that personal interrogation is not required by the sixth amendment or rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
216. The court prospectively announced that failure to comply with the new procedure will
result in reversal. 583 F.2d at 364.
217. United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979) (racial prejudice citing Ristaino v.
Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 597 n.9 (1975)); United States v. Werbrouck, 589 F.2d 273 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1978) (pre-trial publicity); United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (7th
Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 439 U.S. 1066 (1979) (defendant's prior felony convic-
tion).
218. United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds,
439 U.S. 1066 (1979).
219. United States v. Makres, 598 F.2d 1092 (7th Cir. 1978) (defendant had stipulated that
"[a]fter trial has commenced, a maximum of... two jurors may. . . be excused .. by reason of
good cause").
220. United States v. Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242, 253 (7th Cir. 1978), citing United States v.
Arciniega, 574 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 908 (1978).
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trict judges in Winters v. United States22' and United States v. Batchel-
der2 2 2 were not similar; however, the Seventh Circuit approved both
procedures and affirmed the convictions. After the return of a guilty
verdict in Winters, a juror contacted the presiding judge and suggested
that extraneous material (three pages outlining the evidence against the
defendant) had been used by the jury during its deliberations. The
judge arranged to have the complaining juror interviewed by a United
States Marshal, and thereafter the judge reported the results of that
interview to the defense and the prosecution. Winters moved for a new
trial and a modified adversary hearing was conducted by the court,
with defendant and defense counsel present. During the hearing, the
court personally interrogated the jurors and propounded questions to
the jurors which had been submitted by counsel. 22 3 The Seventh Cir-
cuit approved of this procedure and suggested that the case was gov-
erned by Remmer v. United States,224 in which a mid-trial complaint of
jury tampering was investigated by the FBI during the course of the
trial, but not revealed to the defense. Remmer condemned ex parte
investigation of claims of juror misconduct. In Winters, the Seventh
Circuit approved the adversary approach for a post verdict inquiry.
The claim of juror misconduct in Batchelder was not resolved by
adversary proceeding, although the court of appeals suggested that this
was the "better practice. ' '225 In contrast to Winters, the claim in Batch-
elder was resolved through an ex parte evaluation by the district judge.
After the verdict was returned in Batchelder, two jurors told the presid-
ing judge that a third juror had told them, prior to jury deliberations,
about a newspaper article concerning the case. The district judge held
in camera interviews of the jurors, who stated that there had been no
discussion of the news account during jury deliberations. No further
evidentiary inquiry was held. On appeal, the defendant argued that
221. 582 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978).
222. 581 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 439 U.S. 1066 (1979).
223. The district judge's caution was likely motivated by cases suggesting that a jury cannot
impeach its own verdict on the basis of erroneous perceptions of law or fact. United States v.
DiCarlo, 575 F.2d 952 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978). "But a juryman may testify to
any facts bearing upon the question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although not as
to how far that influence operated upon his mind . . .[and] testify in denial or explanation of
acts or declarations outside of the jury room, where evidence of such acts has been given as
ground for a new trial." Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-49 (1892), quoting Weidman
v. Leavitt, 107 U.S. 453 (1888).
224. 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954). In Remner, the Court found that the trial court "should not
decide and take final action ex parte on information such as was received in this case, but should
determine the circumstances, the impact thereof upon the juror, and whether or not it was prejudi-
cial, in a hearing with all interested parties permitted to participate."
225. United States v. Batchelder, 581 F.2d 626, 634 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 439 U.S. 1066 (1979).
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these ex parte interviews violated his due process rights, claiming that
presence of his counsel would have insured vigorous inquiry. The
court held that because the defendant's counsel did not "even seek a
hearing to try to show prejudice," 226 and because the evidence was
overwhelming, any error resulting from the ex parte procedure was
harmless.
It is interesting to note that in affirming the ex pane procedure in
Batchelder, the court relied on Margoles v. United States,227 without
citing Remmer. In Margoles, the Seventh Circuit approved general
questioning of jurors during the course of the trial concerning possible
exposure to pre-trial publicity. The inquiry in Margoles was conducted
in the presence of defendant and his counsel. Unlike Winters and
Batchelder, Margoles was not a post-verdict attack on jury delibera-
tions. Nor was the inquiry ex pane, although the questions were pro-
pounded by the judge rather than counsel. To the extent that the
defendant in Batchelder claimed that extraneous influences might have
tainted the jury verdict, the ex parte inquiry approved by the court is
difficult to reconcile with Remmer and Winters. All three cases sug-
gested extraneous influence on jury deliberations. Both Winters and
Batchelder were post-verdict attacks premised on information acquired
after deliberation and judgment. The court in Batchelder, however,
emphasized that the defendant's counsel did not request an adversary
hearing or move for a new trial, and in some respects that may distin-
guish the two cases.228
INTRODUCTION OF SPECIFIC EVIDENCE
Rules 402229 and 403230 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, provide
the parameters within which recent Seventh Circuit decisions concern-
ing the admissibility of specific evidence must be analyzed. Rule 402
provides that all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise
provided, while rule 403 provides that evidence, although otherwise ad-
missible, may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
226. 581 F.2d at 636.
227. 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir. 1969).
228. See also United States v. Fleming, 594 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979) (two jurors received
inappropriate communications prior to deliberations, and they related the incident to other ju-
rors). Citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), the court noted that "[aIll counsel
agreed to permit the court to question the jurors involved" during a hearing in chambers. 594
F.2d at 608. Other than this brief notation with respect to the agreement of counsel, the Fleming
opinion is silent as to the adversary nature of the proceedings or the presence of defense counsel.
229. FED. R. EvID. 402.
230. FED. R. EvID. 403.
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weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading of the jury. These rules, read in conjunction with the "sub-
stantial right" test of rule 103(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence ex-
pressly or implicitly serve as the basis for the affirmance of virtually
every evidentiary question presented by defendant-appellants to the
Seventh Circuit.23' Cases in which rule 403 served as the express basis
for a decision include United States v. Hooper,23 2 United States v.
Mancillas,233 and United States v. Frankenthal.234  The type of
prejudice asserted was wide-ranging and the court's treatment of the
problem was equally expansive.
Part of the difficulty in undertaking a rule 403-type analysis is that
each proffer of evidence rises and falls upon the context in which it is
raised and the role the evidence plays in the totality of the trial. Conse-
quently, each analysis is extremely subjective. The major part of the
difficulty lies in quantifying the probative value of a particular piece of
evidence and "weighing" it against the prejudicial effect. The aspect of
the test relating to confusion of the issues or misleading the jury is al-
most as elusive.
United States v. Hooper provides an example of the difficulty of
setting out a meaningful rule 403 analysis. The defendant was the asso-
ciate director of a federally-funded program administered through the
University of Wisconsin. A university audit relating to the defendant's
area of responsibility disclosed $1010 in unaccounted for funds. One of
his superiors demanded that he repay the money because of "misman-
agement," and the defendant complied. There was no accusation at
that time of theft or intentional misconduct. At trial, evidence of the
231. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) provides:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence un-
less a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(I) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objec-
tion or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if
the specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the sub-
stance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from
the context within which questions were asked.
232. 596 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1979). Hooper involved admission of evidence of repayment of
unaccounted for money in a government funded program, introduced as a pre-trial admission
against interest.
233. 580 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978). Mancillas involved testi-
mony by a government agent that he had received a tip that a defendant was going to receive some
heroin. The government introduced the statement for foundation purposes to explain the surveil-
lance that was subsequently undertaken.
234. 582 F.2d 1102 (7th Cir. 1978). Frankenthal involved the rebuttal testimony of a district
court judge concerning an encounter he had with a defense witness that tended to indicate bias
and a motive to lie on the part of the defense witness. The court ruled that the mere fact of having
a district court judge testify against a defendant did not create such a prejudicial effect that the
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed.
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repayment was introduced over the defendant's objection as a pre-trial
admission against interest. The defendant contended that the payment
constituted an offer to compromise and should have been excluded. 235
The court first addressed the question of whether the evidence was
excludable under some other rule, specifically rule 408. The court of
appeals concluded that as this matter was not an asserted claim then in
civil litigation it was not a compromise but rather was an admission of
asserted liability.236 The court then addressed the rule 403 question by
examining the advisability of offering proof of restitution where there
was ample independent evidence of guilt. Simultaneously, the court
noted that the evidence was "part and parcel of the charges and of
highly probative value. '237 The only analysis offered as to prejudice
was the observation that the evidence did not involve separate and un-
related acts such as proof of prior crimes "in which the possibility of
great danger of unfair prejudice lurks. '238
In dissent, Judge Swygert also utilized a rule 403 analysis.239 He
concluded, however, that in light of the other evidence offered the pro-
bative value of the restitution was slight and the danger of unfair
prejudice was substantial. His analysis adhered closely to the analysis
of the majority, differing only as to the outcome.
In United States v. Mancilas,240 the court concluded that the pro-
bative value of the proffered evidence, a foundational statement that an
agent had received a tip from an informer that the defendant was going
to receive contraband, was outweighed by the prejudicial effect of the
statement. The court then determined that when one viewed the state-
ment in the context of the totality of the trial, it could not be said that
the statement had an impact on the jury.24' In Mancillas, the court was
more precise in its analysis, narrowing the question to (1) an analysis of
235. See FED. R. EvID. 408.
236. 596 F.2d at 225. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence relates to evidence that
defendant furnished valuable consideration attempting to compromise a claim which was dis-
puted as to validity or amount. The Advisory Committee's Note elaborates that exclusion may be
based on the ground that the evidence is irrelevant, since the offer may be motivated by a desire
for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of position. The defendant in Hooper was
told that even though there was no assertion that he had engaged in any wrongdoing, he was
required to make the repayment. To turn the tables and conclude that the payment was an admis-
sion against interest ignores the fact that the predicate for the payment was mismanagement and
not intentional wrongdoing. Moreover, the public policy considerations underlying rule 408 dic-
tate encouragement of such repayment.
237. 596 F.2d at 226.
238. Id
239. Id at 226-27 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
240. 580 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978).
241. Id at 1311.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
what was added to the government case by the introduction of the evi-
dence, and (2) how the jury would construe the import of the statement.
After addressing the precise issue on appeal, the Mancillas court ana-
lyzed the impact of the evidence on the totality of the jury's delibera-
tions.
United States v. McPartlin242 and United States v. Weatherspoon243
both dealt, in substantially different situations, with the introduction of
documentary records where some question existed as to their reliabil-
ity. McPartlin involved personal diaries maintained in the course of
the defendant's employment activities; Weatherspoon involved founda-
tion requirements for the introduction of computer printouts.
In McPartlin, Benton, an employee of the Ingram Corporation,
dealt with representatives of the Chicago Metropolitan Sanitary Dis-
trict while preparing the corporation's bid for a sludge hauling con-
tract. Specifically, Benton was designated to provide the Sanitary
District officials with "political contributions" to ensure that the corpo-
ration would receive the contract. During the course of his meetings,
Benton maintained a desk calendar-appointment diary which docu-
mented in some detail his dealings with the Sanitary District represent-
atives. Adopting the district court's formulation, the court of appeals
held that these diaries were admissible as business records because they
were kept as part of a regular business activity; made with regularity at
or near the time of the described event; needed to be reliable in order
for Benton to rely on them; and, because there would be little reason
for him to distort or falsify the records. 244
In Weatherspoon, the Seventh Circuit adopted the standards ap-
plied by the Third Circuit 245 and Sixth Circuit 246 for determining the
reliability of computer printouts. That is, the individual making the
proffer of evidence must establish, to the satisfaction of the trial court:
(1) what the input procedures were; (2) that the input procedures were
accurate; (3) that the computer was tested for internal programming
errors on a monthly basis; and, (4) that the printouts were made, main-
tained, and relied upon by the recordkeeper in the ordinary course of
its business activities.
United States v. Guevara247 and United States v. McPardin248 both
242. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979).
243. 581 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1978).
244. 595 F.2d at 1347.
245. United States v. Liebert, 519 F.2d 542 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975).
246. United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1973).
247. 598 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1979).
248. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979).
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addressed the substance of rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of
Evidence-prior consistent statements of a witness which are not con-
sidered hearsay. 249 The rule provides that a statement is not hearsay if:
(1) the declarant testifies; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examina-
tion; (3) the statement is consistent with the subsequent testimony; and,
(4) the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication. In Guevara, the court held
that it was error, although harmless, to introduce prior consistent state-
ments to rebut the implication that the declarant had an improper mo-
tive to testify when that same improper motive existed at the time of the
original statement.250 Similarly, in McPartlin, the court affirmed the
exclusion of prior consistent statements where there was a different, im-
proper motive to lie at the time of the earlier statement.251
Finally, in United States v. Rose,252 the government, through neg-
ligence, lost a tape of a telephone conversation between a defendant
and the government informer. The court ruled that once the trial court
determined that the loss of the tape was the result of negligence, it was
within the court's discretion to permit testimony concerning the conver-
sation, based upon whether the defense was so greatly prejudiced by
the absence of the recording as to require sanction.253
RULE 404(B)--EVIDENCE OF PRIOR SIMILAR ACTS
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evi-
dence of other crimes, wrongdoing, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
with that character. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 254 Three cases de-
cided by the Seventh Circuit with regard to this rule are significant in
that they affirmatively follow the "traditional, '' 255 pre-Federal Rules of
249. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(I)(B) provides, in pertinent part:
A statement is not hearsay if-
(I) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-exami-
nation concerning the statement, and the statement is . . .(B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive ...
250. 598 F.2d at 1100.
251. 595 F.2d at 1351-52.
252. 590 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1978).
253. Id at 237.
254. FED. R. EviD. 404(b).
255. See United States v. Feinberg, 535 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir.), ceri. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976);
United States v. Broadway, 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Evidence standard that such acts must be proved by "clear and con-
vincing" evidence in order to justify their admission.
The three Seventh Circuit cases, United States v. McPartin2 5 6
United States v. Dixon,2 5 7 and United States v. Dolliole,258 stand in
sharp contrast to United States v. Beechum,259 a recent Fifth Circuit
opinion. In Beechum, a 10-5 en banc decision, the Fifth Circuit over-
ruled United States v. Broadway,260 a pre-Federal Rules of Evidence
decision that ratified the clear and convincing standard.26' The opinion
in Beechum was based on an analysis derived from rule 104(b) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. That is, the court held that the standard for
the introduction of evidence of prior acts was that "the preliminary fact
can be decided by the judge against the proponent only where the jury
could not reasonably find the preliminary fact to exist." 262 This analy-
sis led the Fifth Circuit to the conclusion that it was not necessary for
the trial court to require the government to come forward with clear
and convincing proof when it propounds prior act evidence.
Beechum, an en banc decision, was specifically referred to in a
footnote in McPartlin,263 the first of the Seventh Circuit's three rule
404(b) cases. While the McPartlin court did not itself criticize
Beechum, the footnote drew special reference to the dissent in
Beechum, which sharply criticized the majority's reasoning. Moreover,
the McPartlin court expressly stated that the appropriate test was the
clear and convincing standard. 264
Two other aspects of the court's ruling in McPart/in are signifi-
cant.265 First, the court observed that there is no need under rule
404(b) for the acts to be identical. Second, the court stated that when
challenging on appeal, the introduction of the evidence on the grounds
that the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value, the defendant
256. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979).
257. 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979).
258. 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979).
259. 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979).
260. 477 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1973).
261. FED. R. EVID. 104(b).
262. 582 F.2d at 913, quoting 21 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE: EVIDENCE § 5054 at 269 (1977).
263. 595 F.2d 1321, 1344 n.30.
264. Id. at 1344.
265. McPardin involved a prosecution for bribery and bid-rigging in which the defendant
claimed that he was the victim of extortion. The government was permitted to introduce evidence
that the defendant had previously made surreptitious payments to an employee of a semi-public
Brazilian corporation. The defendant challenged this evidence based upon the dissimilarities be-
tween the moral climate in Brazil and the United States and further on the basis that the prejudi-
cial effect outweighed the probative value. Id at 1344-45.
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must show that admission of the challenged evidence constituted an
abuse of the court's discretion, because the balancing of those two con-
siderations is "uniquely appropriate to the informed discretion of the
trial judge. '266
Although the Seventh Circuit did not mention Beechum in either
Dixon267 or Dolliole,268 the court in both cases, while affirming the in-
troduction of the 404(b) evidence, drew special reference to the contin-
ued vitality of the clear and convincing standard. Moreover, in
Dolliole, the court cited Eighth and Ninth Circuit cases that had re-
cently reaffirmed the clear and convincing standard.269
Dolliole also states that the rule 404(b) evidence must be essential
to the government's case.270 The court notes that the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes to rules 403 and 404(b) envision that the need for the evi-
dence is an appropriate consideration in the balancing of probity
against prejudice.
CONSPIRACY
During the past year, the Seventh Circuit decided several cases
involving the admission of testimony pursuant to rule 801(d)(2)(E) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule. 27' In the most significant of these decisions, United States
v. Santiago,272 the court clarified the state of the law in the circuit con-
cerning the procedure to be followed and the test to be used in intro-
ducing such testimony.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement made by a co-conspir-
ator during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy is not hear-
say. Thus, when a statement that otherwise would be considered
hearsay is proffered as a co-conspirator's statement, preliminary ques-
tions arise as to whether a conspiracy has been sufficiently established
and whether the declaration was made during the course of and in fur-
266. Id. at 1345.
267. United States v. Dixon, 596 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1979).
268. United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979).
269. Id. at 106, citing United States v. Drury, 582 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Herrell, 588 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 964 (1979); United States v. Goehring,
585 F.2d 371 (8th Cir. 1978).
270. In Dolliole, the defendant was charged with driving the get-away car in a bank robbery.
The defense was lack of knowledge. The government's 404(b) evidence consisted of the testimony
that the defendant had acted similarly in other bank robberies. 597 F.2d at 104, 106.
271. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides:
A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) The statement is offered against a party and is ...(E) a statement by a
co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
272. 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
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therance of the conspiracy. The procedures for determining such ques-
tions are governed by rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.273
Prior to Santiago, the admissibility of such statements was considered
to be governed by rule 104(b). The court would admit the testimony
and instruct the jury that the acts and declarations of one of the alleged
co-conspirators made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy
could not be used against another alleged co-conspirator until it had
been established by independent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt
that a conspiracy existed and that the other alleged co-conspirator was
a member of that conspiracy.27 4 The jury was then expected to sort
through the evidence, disregarding often extremely prejudicial state-
ments, and reach a conclusion as to the conspiracy. Then, if conspira-
torial guilt had been concluded beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
was to consider the statements as additional evidence.
Santiago concluded that the preliminary determination as to ad-
missibility of the statements is a matter of competency under rule
104(a) and not of conditional relevancy under rule 104(b). That is, the
court must determine whether or not the conspiracy has been estab-
lished by sufficient, independent evidence so as to allow admission of
co-conspirator declarations. Counsel is no longer permitted to argue to
the jury that the jury is to make a determination as to whether to con-
sider the statements.
Additionally, the Santiago court addressed the question of the de-
gree of proof necessary to permit the introduction of co-conspirator's
statements, specifically directing that trial courts should use the civil
preponderance of the evidence test to determine admissibility.275 Santi-
ago placed the Seventh Circuit in agreement with the First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. 276 The Sixth and Ninth Cir-
273. FED. R. EvID. 104 (a and b) provides:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility
of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
274. United States v. Santos, 385 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968).
275. 582 F.2d at 1134-35.
276. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Petroz-
ziello, 548 F.2d 20 (Ist Cir. 1977); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1104 (1976); United States v. Stroupe, 538 F.2d 1063 (4th Cir. 1976).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
cuits use a prima facie standard, 277 which Santiago specifically re-
jected.278
Santiago left to the trial court the decision of whether to permit the
introduction of the statements conditionally, dependent upon a later
showing of conspiracy, or whether to require an independent showing
prior to the introduction of the statements. 279 It did not reach the issue
of whether the trial court could use the statements in determining
whether there was a conspiracy. 280
In United States v. Zoperstein,28' unindicted co-conspirators were
permitted to testify as to conversations among themselves conducted
outside the presence of the defendants. The court saw no difficulty in
permitting this testimony as long as the statements were made during
the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 282
Finally, note should be taken of three cases that dealt with the
question of when a statement is made in furtherance of a conspiracy.
In United States v. McPartin,283 the court addressed the question of the
admissibility of the business diaries of a government witness who had
been a briber in a bid-rigging scheme. While the court held the diaries
admissible as business records, 284 it stated in dictum that these diaries
also fell within the scope of rule 801(d)(2)(E). 285 The court specifically
noted that the diaries were kept in furtherance of the conspiracy be-
cause Benton had relied on them in carrying out his bribery and bid-
rigging scheme.
In United States v. Gandara,286 the defendant was convicted, on
the basis of entirely circumstantial evidence of distributing heroin.
Some time prior to the transaction the co-defendant, in negotiating
with the agents, told the agents he could get "enough of it" (heroin).28 7
This statement was made after the parties had reached their agreement
as to the terms of the sale. The court of appeals ruled that, while harm-
less, this statement should not have been admitted under rule
277. United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977);
United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1975), ceri. denied, 424 U.S. 967 (1976).
278. 582 F.2d at 1135.
279. Id at 1131. A pre-trial, independent showing of conspiracy, often the only way to ensure
against a mistrial under Santiago principles, can be effectively used to obtain pre-trial discovery.
280. Id
281. 601 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1979).
282. Id at 294.
283. 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979).
284. See text accompanying notes 242-44 supra.
285. 595 F.2d at 1351.
286. 586 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1978).
287. Id at 1159.
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801(d)(2)(E), as it did nothing to further the conspiracy. The court ob-
served that once an agreement had been reached as to the sale of her-
oin, the statement that the co-defendant had a source was mere
surplusage. 88
Gandara appears to conflict with United States v. Fitzgerald.289 In
Fitzgerald, the indictment charged a conspiracy to commit mail fraud
through a bid-rigging scheme, in which one defendant, an official of an
Indiana Sanitary District, was bribed in order to influence the approval
of a sewer project. It also charged a conspiracy to defraud the IRS by
obstructing the computation, assessment, and collection of taxes. This
was done through the formation of a Swiss Corporation by five of the
seven co-defendants. The Swiss Corporation charged consulting fees
for non-existent services which were then deducted as a business ex-
pense. The corporation was dissolved in early 1972. Later that year,
one of the co-defendants made statements in response to the queries of
an independent auditor which appeared to cover up the function of the
Swiss Corporation. The court summarily concluded that it was not er-
ror to permit the testimony of the auditors, as there appeared to be a
sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the statements had been
made in furtherance of the conspiracy. 290
Fitzgerald also raised issues as to whether a multiple conspiracy
had been prejudicially charged 29' and whether the statute of limitations
had run as to the primary objectives of the conspiracy. 292 The court
dealt with these questions in the same manner that it dealt with the
question of the admissibility of the co-conspirators' statements. That is,
that there was one conspiracy with several minor or subsidiary agree-
288. Id
289. 579 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978).
290. 579 F.2d at 1020. Fitzgerald was decided prior to United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d
1128 (7th Cir. 1978). Arguably, under Santiago this determination should be made by the trial
court pursuant to rule 104(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
291. 579 F.2d at 1018. This type of argument is based upon the Supreme Court's holding in
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946). Kotteakos involved a situation in which one
individual would submit loan applications for several individuals pursuant to a federal housing
program, in which the true purpose of the loan was not within the purposes of the program. The
individuals whose names were used did not know or know of each other. The Court likened this
scheme to a wheel with spokes but no connecting rim, and held that charging such a conspiracy in
a single indictment prejudiced each of the individual defendants.
292. 579 F.2d at 1019. This argument is based on Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391
(1957). Grunewald recognized that every conspiracy is designed to be carried out in secrecy and
refused to toll the statute of limitations because of acts to conceal the conspiracy after it had been
discovered. The Court made special note that there was no evidence to indicate an original agree-
ment among the conspirators to continue to act in concert in order to cover up, for their own self-
protection, traces of the crime after its commission. Id. at 404.
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ments, each of which involved some but not all of the conspirators. 293
Citing Blumenthal v. United States,294 the court stated that the co-con-
spirators are bound so long as the results fall within the common pur-
pose of the conspiracy and they knowingly contribute to its
furtherance. Certain overt acts were committed by a few of the co-
conspirators in order to conceal the conspiracy. Each co-conspirator
was held to be responsible for the acts of other co-conspirators that
were committed as part of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is
the final acts of concealment here, for which all co-conspirators are re-
sponsible, that fall within the statute of limitations.295 It is only neces-
sary that those acts further the main purpose of the conspiracy within
the meaning of Grunewald.296
United States P. D'Andrea297 and United States v. Rose298 also
dealt with the substantive nature of conspiracy. In D'Andrea, under-
capitalized individuals sought to construct low-income housing, apply-
ing to the Federal Housing Authority for mortgage insurance. Because
of cash-flow difficulties created by federal regulations that control the
release of funds, certain false statements were made to the housing au-
thority in order to obtain the release of the funds. The project was
eventually discontinued. The defendants argued that the project did
not fail because of the false statements but rather because of unforeseen
difficulties encountered in the course of construction. They further ar-
gued that there was no evidence that any federal money was paid out
for work that was not done or that any of the alleged co-conspirators
were unjustly enriched through their participation in the project.
In affirming the convictions, the court did not seem to take issue
with the defendants' factual arguments. The court of appeals pointed
293. 579 F.2d at 1018.
294. 332 U.S. 539 (1947). Blumenthal involved the unlawful sale of whiskey at over-ceiling
prices during the period of price controls in World War 11. The Court there held that even though
proof at trial failed to establish a link between two sets of salesmen selling the same whiskey
through the same distributor, the proof was such that the salesmen all constituted small parts of
the same large conspiracy, a conspiracy which was designed to illegally distribute the whiskey.
295. 579 F.2d at 1019.
296. See note 292 supra.
297. 585 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979).
298. 590 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1978), Rose held that a conviction for conspiracy will be sup-
ported even though the substantive crime was never committed because the defendants unknow-
ingly hired federal agents to commit the substantive crime.
In United States v. Page, 580 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Washington, 586
F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978), the court dealt with challenges to conspiracy convictions based on the
sufficiency of the evidence. In each case, the court pointed out that only slight evidence is needed
to support a conviction for conspiracy as conspiracies by their nature are carried out in secret and
direct evidence of agreement is rarely available.
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out that 18 U.S.C. § 371,299 under which the defendants were charged,
embraces much more than common law fraud.300 Rather, it reaches
any conspiracy for the purpose of impairing, obstructing, or defeating
the lawful function of any department of government, 30 and it is not
necessary that the conspirators receive a pecuniary advantage, or that
the government suffer a pecuniary loss. 30 2
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Considerations of due process 30 3 require that a jury determine
guilt or innocence on the basis of correct instructions of law which
properly define the elements of the charge and the burdens of proof.3°4
The instructions must be read to the jury, and, at the judge's discretion,
the written instructions may be given to the jury during their delibera-
tions.30 5 The Seventh Circuit unequivocally places the burden on
counsel to submit appropriate instructions to the court 30 6 and to make
specific objections to instructions on the record to preserve appellate
review.307
In evaluating and reviewing the accuracy of jury instructions a fo-
cal point of inquiry this term has been the distinction between specific
299. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1979) provides, in pertinent part:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose,
and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
300. 585 F.2d at 1354.
301. Id See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
302. 585 F.2d at 1354. See Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182 (1924); United
States v. Bradford, 148 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. La. 1905). Judge Swygert filed a lengthy dissent vigor-
ously condemning the government prosecution in D',ndrea. A substantial portion of his dissent
deals with the evidence elicited at trial and concludes that the actions of the defendants did not
constitute criminal intent to defraud. Finally, he points out that the case represents an archetype
of prosecutorial abuse of the conspiracy statute. 585 F.2d at 1358 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
303. Compare Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (due process violation to omit pre-
sumption of innocence instruction) with Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (failure to give
presumption of innocence instruction not due process violation given totality of circumstances).
304. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 590 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1979) (reversible error to omit
from instruction that government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not
entrapped).
305. United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979).
306. Id at 1110. Compare United States v. Fitzgerald, 579 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1002 (1978) (ex parte modification of instructions by judge after instruction conference
and closing arguments not error) with United States v. Hollinger, 553 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1977)
(counsel entitled to know instructions prior to closing argument and charge to the jury). See also
United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1977).
307. If giving a particular instruction or failure to give a tendered instruction amounts to plain
error, the record need not be preserved by timely objection. See United States v. Burnett, 495
F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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and general intent. In United States v. Arambasich,3 08 the court of ap-
peals noted the "variety, . . . disparity . . . [and] confusion of judicial
definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element. ' 30 9 Although
standard instructions on specific and general intent 310 have been ap-
proved in numerous cases, the Seventh Circuit observed that the dis-
tinctions are both confusing and misleading. In Arambasich, the
defendant was charged with Hobbs Act extortion affecting interstate
commerce. The district court rejected the pro forma specific intent in-
structions tendered by the defendant's counsel and drafted its own in-
struction which defined the elements of the offense without reference to
the term "intent." 31' In approving the district court's instruction, the
Seventh Circuit suggested that "more specific and therefore more com-
prehensible information is conveyed by stating the precise mental state
required for the particular crime," 312 rather than relying on rhetoric
embodied in the standardized instructions. 313
Similarly, in United States v. Allen 3 14 and United States v. Lar-
son, 31 5 the Seventh Circuit again discouraged the use of standardized
or pattern jury instructions which attempt to define reasonable
doubt. 316 The court noted that although it is not error to give such an
instruction when tendered by the defense, "[r]easonable doubt may be
better left to speak for itself."31 7
One further aspect of the court's consideration of pattern jury in-
structions deserves brief comment. 31 8 In United States v. Muscarella319
308. 597 F.2d 609 (7th Cir, 1979).
309. Id at 612, quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
310. 597 F.2d at 612-13. See E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS §§ 14.01, 14.03 (3d ed. 1977); L. LABuY, JURY INSTRUCTION IN FEDERAL CRIMI-
NAL CASES § 4.04, (7th ed. 1965) [hereinafter referred to as LABUY].
311. Specifically, the court framed the analysis in terms of the defendant's knowledge that he
was not entitled to payments and knowledge that the payments were made to him out of fear of
economic harm. The court further defined knowingly as acting voluntarily and purposefully, not
by mistake or accident, in light of all the facts and circumstances. 597 F.2d at 612.
312. 1d. at 611.
313. The court reviewed specific and general intent instructions in the following cases decided
this term: United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1979)
(Sherman Act violations); United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) (bribery as
defense to Hobbs Act extortion); United States v. Waronek, 582 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1978) (theft
from interstate shipment); United States v. Larson, 581 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1978) (bank fraud and
embezzlement); United States v. Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1978) (solicitation of bribery).
314. 596 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
315. 581 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1978).
316. See also United States v. Loman, 551 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 912
(1977).
317. 596 F.2d at 230.
318. During the past year, a committee composed of judges and local practitioners has begun
the task of revising the pattern federal jury instructions to remove confusing verbiage and focus on
understandable legal principles and elements of offenses.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
and United States v. Gabriel,320 the court of appeals specifically ap-
proved challenged language in the standardized LaBuy "knowledge"
instruction which charges that "[n]o person can intentionally avoid
knowledge by closing his eyes to facts which should prompt him to
investigate."' 321 Auscarella suggested that this language implicitly pre-
sumed knowledge by the defendant, however, the court adhered to its
earlier decision in United States v. Prewitt,322 in approving the use of
the pattern instruction.
CLOSING ARGUMENTS
The United States Supreme Court has held that the prosecutor
may "strike hard blows, [but] he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." 323
This principle is scrupulously applied in the area of misconduct in
prosecutorial closing arguments. The prosecutor may argue every rea-
sonable inference supported by the record, and may even argue that the
defense is a concocted story and that defense witnesses are lying. 324
The prosecutor may not, however, refer to uncharged crimes 325 or the
defendant's exercise of the fifth amendment privilege. In the context of
comment on the fifth amendment privilege, the Seventh Circuit this
term, in United States v. Buege,326 held that a prosecutor cannot argue
that the evidence is "uncontradicted," or "unrefuted" in cases where
the defendant has exercised the fifth amendment privilege and re-
mained silent. 327 The court's decision was premised on Griffin v. Cali-
fornia,328 in which direct comment on the failure of the defendant to
testify was held to be reversible error. To the extent that direct com-
ment on the failure to testify is a burden on the fifth amendment guar-
antee, "it cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion CoStly. ' 32 9
In implementing the rationale of Griffin, numerous circuits have
319. 585 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978).
320. 597 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1979).
321. LABUY, supra note 310, at §4.05.
322. 553 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 840 (1977).
323. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
324. See United States v. Micklus, 581 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1978).
325. Compare United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's suggestion of
uncharged crime not supported by record held reversible error) with United States v. McPartlin,
595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) (prosecutor's suggestion of uncharged crime supported by circum-
stantial evidence held not error).
326. 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871 (1978).
327. Where such a comment is followed by a curative instruction by the judge, it may be
considered harmless error. United States v. Buege, 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Muscarella, 585 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hansen, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1978).
328. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
329. Id at 614.
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disapproved the use of the terms, "uncontroverted" or "uncontra-
dicted" evidence in those cases where the non-testifying defendant is
the only person able to controvert or contradict the government's evi-
dence.330 The First Circuit adopted a per se rule requiring summary
reversal where those terms are invoked by the prosecutor.33' In United
States v. Buege,33 2 the Seventh Circuit took a more reasoned approach,
recognizing that Griffin condemned direct comment on the exercise of
the right, and only those statements which are "manifestly intended to
be or [are] of such a character that the jury [may take them] to be com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify" 333 should warrant rever-
sal.334 Although the court in Buege declined to adopt the per se rule, a
later unpublished order prospectively indicated that indirect comment
on the fifth amendment privilege will result in summary reversal.335
Pursuant to its supervisory powers, the court has the authority to
adopt such a per se rule, however, such a rule would be difficult to
reconcile with the Supreme Court's case-by-case evaluation of the indi-
rect comment on the privilege. 336
SENTENCING
The contention that consecutive sentences were improperly im-
posed for the commission of essentially the same act raises two ques-
tions: whether Congress intended that the crimes should be prosecuted
and punished cumulatively, and, if so, whether the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment is violated by the cumulative punish-
ment.337 Under Blockburger v. United States,338 the Supreme Court
330. United States v. Cornfeld, 563 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 563
F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ward 552 F.2d 1080 (5th Cir. 1977).
331. United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1971). But see United States v.
Goldman, 563 F.2d 501 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1977).
332. 578 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 871 (1978).
333. United States v. Lyon, 397 F.2d 505, 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968).
334. A more interesting question with respect to indirect comment on failure to testify is
presented in multiple defendant cases where less than all defendants testify and defense counsel
emphasize that fact for the jury. United States v. Ziperstein, 601 F.2d 281, 286 (7th Cir. 1979)
(where counsel for testifying defendant told the jury that "an innocent man almost invariably is
eager to take the witness stand," held not error or basis for severance). But see De Luna v. United
States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
335. Circuit Rule 35 precludes use of unpublished orders as precedent, however, in United
States v. Moody, No. 78-1981 (7th Cir. Feb. 27, 1979) (unpublished opinion), the court clearly
served notice that "continued failure to heed [the] admonition will ... call for summary rever-
sal."
336. Cf Lockett v. Ohio, 436 U.S 586, 595 (1978) (comment by prosecutor that evidence re-
mained uncontradicted not error when defense attorney had told jury that defendant would testify
when in fact defendant did not take the stand).
337. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 11 (1978).
338. 284 U.S. 299 (1932). While double jeopardy is not referred to in Blockburger, in Brown
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held that the determination of whether there has been a double jeop-
ardy violation depends upon "whether each provision requires proof of
a fact which the other does not. '339
This analysis was applied by the court in United States v.
Mat his, 40 United States v. Stavros, 341 and United States v. Makres.34 2
In Mathis, consecutive sentences were imposed for theft of government
property343 and assaulting a federal officer by use of a deadly
weapon.344  The assault occurred during the course of the theft. In
Makres, consecutive sentences were imposed for possession of stolen
mai 3 45 and uttering United States Treasury checks with forged en-
dorsements. 346 The checks were enclosed in the stolen mail that the
v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) it was recognized that the double jeopardy clause prohibits cumula-
tive punishment.
339. 284 U.S. at 304.
340. 579 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1978).
341. 597 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1979).
342. 598 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1979).
343. 18 U.S.C. § 2112 (1979) provides:
Whoever robs another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the
United States, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years.
344. 18 U.S.C. § 111 (1979) provides, in pertinent part:
Whoever forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates or interferes with any
person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the
performance of his official duties, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not
more than three years, or both.
345. 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (1979) provides:
Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains, or attempts so
to obtain, from or out of any mail, post office, or station thereof, letter box, mail recepta-
cle, or any mail route or other authorized depository for mail matter, or from a letter or
mail carrier, any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or abstracts or removes from
any such letter, package, bag, or mail, any article or thing contained therein, or secretes,
embezzles, or destroys any such letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article
or thing contained therein; or
Whoever steals, takes, or abstracts, or by fraud or deception obtains any letter, pos-
tal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein which has been
left for collection upon or adjacent to a collection box or other authorized depository of
mail matter; or
Whoever buys, receives, or conceals, or unlawfully has in his possession, any letter,
postal card, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein, which has
been so stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted, as herein described, knowing the same to
have been stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted-
Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
346. 18 U.S.C. § 495 (1979) provides:
Whoever falsely makes, alters, forges, or counterfeits any deed, power of attorney,
order, certificate, receipt, contract, or other writing, for the purpose of obtaining or re-
ceiving, or of enabling any other person, either directly or indirectly, to obtain or receive
from the United States or any officers or agents thereof, any sum of money; or
Whoever utters or publishes as true any such false, forged, altered, or counterfeited
writing, with intent to defraud the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered,
forge d, or counterfeited; or
Whoever transmits to, or presents at any office or officer of the United States, any
such writingin support of, or in relation to, any account or claim, with intent to defraud
the United States, knowing the same to be false, altered, forged, or counterfeited-
Shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
194
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defendant possessed. In both Maths 347 and Makres,348 the court had
little difficulty in affirming the judgments as, in each case, the elements
of one offense involved proof that is not contained in the other offense,
and Congress intended to deal with separate and distinct policy consid-
erations in enacting each statute.
In Stavros, the analysis is more complicated as the separate stat-
utes could be violated in a variety of ways. The defendant was charged
with accepting wages and wilfully failing to pay the 26 U.S.C. § 4411
wager tax and failing to register as required by 26 U.S.C. § 4412, all in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. 34 9 In separate counts relating to the
same acts, the defendant was charged with having engaged in the busi-
ness of accepting wagers without having paid the section 4411 tax, in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7262.350 In United States v. Shaffer,3 5 1 the Sev-
enth Circuit had ruled that under the facts of that case, it was possible
to violate section 7203 without violating section 7262. Proceeding on a
case-by-case analysis, the court found that, under the facts of Statvros,
the government could not prove the section 7203 violations without
also proving the section 7262 violations. Consequently, the defendant's
double jeopardy protections had been violated and the cumulative
sentences were vacated.
Both Mathis352 and United States v. Tucker353 dealt with the prohi-
bition of an increased sentence following remand. This prohibition is
based upon the premise that it is a violation of due process to impart
the appearance of vindictiveness for the exercise of the statutory right
to appeal. 354 Consequently, if a trial court is to impose a more severe
sentence upon remand, the reasons for doing so must appear on the
347. 579 F.2d at 418-19. See also text accompanying notes 352-357 infra.
348. 598 F.2d at 1072.
349. 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1979) provides:
Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or required by
this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make a return (other than a
return required under authority of section 6015), keep any records, or supply any infor-
mation, who willfully fails to pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such
records, or supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and,
upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000. or imprisoned not more
than I year, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.
350. 597 F.2d at 110. 26 U.S.C. § 7262 (1979) provides:
Any person who does any act which makes him liable for special tax under subchapter B
of chapter 35 without having paid such tax, shall, besides being liable to the payment of
the tax, be fined not less than $1,000 and not more than $5,000.
351. 291 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1961).
352. 579 F.2d at 415.
353. 581 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1978).
354. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
record. 3.5
In Mathis, the defendant was originally sentenced to concurrent
sentences of eight years and three years. On remand, he was sentenced
to six years and a consecutive term of five years probation. The court
refused to view this sentence as a whole and modified the sentences to
run concurrently. 356 In so doing, the court of appeals adopted the Sec-
ond Circuit's approach, in which the "maximum which the appellant
might be required to serve under the terms of the judgment" is consid-
ered.357
In Tucker, an enhanced sentence was imposed after retrial. Al-
though the trial court did not state that it relied on evidence introduced
at the second trial that had not been introduced at the first trial, the
government attempted to argue that such evidence justified the en-
hanced sentence. The court rejected this argument on two grounds.
First, the court pointed out that as the policy is designed to avoid the
appearance of vindictiveness, it is implicit that the trial court itself must
articulate, on the record, the basis for the enhanced sentence. 358 Sec-
ond, additional testimony as to facts that pre-dated the first conviction
do not satisfy the "intervening detrimental deportment" require-
ment.
359
The argument that the trial court had penalized defendants for as-
serting fifth and sixth amendment rights was raised in United States v.
Allen,360 United States v. Washington,361 and United States v. Santi-
ago.362 In Allen, the trial court had stated that, in part, its sentence was
based on the fact that the defendant did not testify at trial despite no
prior convictions that could have served as the basis for impeachment,
on the fact that he was obviously guilty, and finally on the fact that he
showed no remorse. 363 In Washington, the court considered the de-
fendants' prior convictions under a possession of marijuana statute that
was later declared unconstitutional and viewed the defendants' in-
volvement in the offense solely on the basis of the government's evi-
dence in light of the fact that the defendants did not testify and would
355. Id at 726.
356. See United States v. Barash, 428 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 938
(1971).
357. 579 F.2d at 419, quoting United States v. Barash, 428 F.2d 328, 330 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 938 (1971).
358. 581 F.2d at 605-06.
359. Id at 606. See Wood v. Ross, 434 F.2d 297, 299 (4th Cir. 1970).
360. 596 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1979).
361. 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978).
362. 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978).
363. 596 F.2d at 231 n.3.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
not talk to a probation officer preparing a pre-sentencing report. 364 Fi-
nally, in Santiago, the district court, at sentencing, commented that the
defendant had been involved in the transaction yet continued to deny
his guilt, which was "another strike against him, as far as I am con-
cerned."365
In each case, the sentence was affirmed based upon principles
spelled out by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Grayson.366 That is, modern sentencing concepts require that the sen-
tencing court evaluate the convicted defendant's potential for rehabili-
tation, and that such a determination requires an examination of the
"defendant's whole person and personality. 3
67
Finally, in United States v. Cooper,368 the defendant was convicted
of two robberies of individuals possessing postal service funds.369 The
robberies were commited on successive days. The trial court sentenced
the defendant to 10 years and 25 years concurrent under a provision of
18 U.S.C. § 2114 that states the maximum period of imprisonment is
ten years and that for a subsequent offense the period of imprisonment
shall be twenty-five years. The court examined the legislative history
and concluded that the term "subsequent arrest and conviction there-
fore" should be read into the mandatory twenty-five year section of the
statute.370 Therefore, the twenty-five year mandatory provision of sec-
tion 2114 only applies to a robbery committed at a time when the de-
fendant has a prior section 2114 robbery conviction on his record.
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
In United States v. Robinson,37 1 the defendant was charged with
conspiracy, civil rights violations, and kidnapping resulting in murder
in connection with the shooting of one Jeff Beard. The chief govern-
ment witness at trial, O'Neal, testified that he received the murder
weapon from Robinson and thereafter O'Neal gave the gun to his fa-
364. 586 F.2d at 1155-56.
365. 582 F.2d at 1136.
366. 438 U.S. 41 (1978). In Grajson, the Supreme Court approved the sentencing court's con-
sideration that a defendant had committed perjury in testifying at trial.
367. Id. at 55. Cf United States v. Gandara, 586 F.2d 1156 (7th Cir. 1978), in which the pre-
sentencing report required by rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was waived
by the defendant just prior to the imposition of the maximum sentence permitted. The court of
appeals refused to hold that this waiver constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel, espe-
cially in light of rule 32(c)(I), which specifically contemplates the possibility of waiver. 586 F.2d
at 1160.
368. 580 F.2d 259 (7th Cir. 1978).
369. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2114 (1979).
370. 580 F.2d at 261, 263.
371. 585 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 947 (1979).
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ther. O'Neal's father testified at trial that he cleaned the gun by boiling
it, and he then used a cloth and coathanger with light machine oil to
clean the barrel. He further testified that the cloth may have separated
from the coathanger in the cleaning process, and scratches may have
been made inside the barrel. The government ballistics expert was un-
able to conclude that the weapon cleaned by O'Neal's father was in fact
the weapon used to kill Beard because of barrel riflings. The expert
further testified that the cleaning procedure could have altered the bar-
rel and could explain the inability to make a positive ballistics identifi-
cation. Six months after Robinson's conviction, Robinson sought
production of the gun for scientific examination to verify the cleaning
technique testified to by O'Neal's father at trial. After Robinson's orig-
inal appeal was affirmed, 37 2 the district court granted Robinson's mo-
tion for production of the weapon. The test results indicated that the
weapon had not been cleaned in the manner in which O'Neal's father
had testified at trial. On this basis, Robinson sought habeas corpus re-
lief and a new trial.
Robinson argued that this evidence entitled him to a new trial be-
cause critical testimony was false, 373 or alternatively, the new evidence,
though not establishing perjured testimony, would probably lead to an
acquittal. 374 The district judge rejected both theories, finding that de-
fense counsel had failed to exercise due diligence during trial. The
Seventh Circuit posited the standard of review as "whether the district
court's denial of Robinson's motion for a new trial on the basis of lack
of due diligence was 'wholly unsupported by evidence.' ",375 The court
concluded that as the government expert's report and testimony with
respect to the possible consequences of the cleaning method were avail-
able to defense counsel at trial, his lack of diligence foreclosed appel-
late consideration.
The new trial standard, as well as the concepts of plain error and
372. United States v. Robinson, 503 F.2d 208 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 949 (1975).
373. See Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928). Larrison requires granting a
new trial when the court is satisfied that testimony given by a material witness was false, and
further that the jury might have reached a different conclusion given that knowledge of its falsity.
Moreover, Larrison requires that the movant for the new trial be taken by surprise when the false
testimony was given, or learn of its falsity after trial. 24 F.2d at 87-88.
374. In the new trial evaluation under rule 33, if the basis for the claim is other than perjured
testimony (as governed by Larrison), the test is whether the evidence came to the defendant's
knowledge after trial and could not have been discovered sooner with due diligence. The newly
discovered evidence must be material, not merely impeaching or cumulative, such that the evi-
dence would probably lead to acquittal in the event of retrial. United States v. Johnson, 142 F.2d
588 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 806 (1944).
375. 585 F.2d at 279, quoting United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111 (1946).
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harmless error, exemplify the shifting judicial perspectives. 376 Cer-
tainly the emphasis on a just process rather than a just result is an ap-
propriate appellate posture, but it is one that values finality over the
"satisfaction that the search for the truth has been pursued as far as
may reasonably be possible. '3 77
PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES
The law of prisoners' rights and remedies has been significantly
affected during the past several years by the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the scope of habeas corpus relief. In Stone v.
Powell,378 the Court held that a state prisoner may not be granted fed-
eral habeas corpus relief on the ground that unconstitutionally ob-
tained evidence was admitted at trial, if the state has provided an
opportunity for full and fair consideration of the claim. 379 The Court
reached this conclusion "by weighing the utility of the exclusionary
rule against the costs of extending it to collateral review of Fourth
Amendment claims," 380 noting that "[sitate courts, like federal courts,
have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to
uphold federal law. '38 1 In Wainwright v. Sykes, 382 the Court held that
failure to comply with a state procedural requirement for objecting to
the admission of a confession at trial precluded federal habeas corpus
review of the defendant's constitutional claim. The Court recognized
that a habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to an independent federal
court examination of a constitutional claim despite the adverse resolu-
tion in the state court proceeding. 38 3 Wainwright, however, involved
"contentions of federal law which were not resolved . ..due to . ..
failure to raise them there as required by state procedure." 384
The Seventh Circuit has implemented the rationale of Stone v.
Powell and Wainwright v. Sykes in several cases during the past term,
focusing on the opportunity of the petitioner to litigate the claim in the
state court proceedings. For example, Stone v. Powell was held to be
376. See. e.g., United States v. Disston, 582 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1978).
377. 585 F.2d at 283. (Wood, J., dissenting). It remains to be seen whether this focus on the
quality and diligence of defense counsel will be accompanied by a reassessment of standards of
competency of counsel. See United States ex rel. Williams v. Twomey, 510 F.2d 634 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975).
378. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
379. Id.
380. Id. at 489.
381. Id. at 493 n.35.
382. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
383. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
384. 433 U.S. at 87 (emphasis in original).
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dispositive in United Slates ex rel Barksdale v. Sielaff.385 The defend-
ant in Barksdale had argued unsuccessfully to suppress evidence at
trial, however, on direct appeal he did not raise the fourth amendment
issue. 386 Finding that the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the
fourth amendment claim had been available to the defendant, but that
he had failed to avail himself of it, the Seventh Circuit foreclosed
habeas corpus relief.38 7
In United States ex rel Maxey v. Morris,38 8 a habeas petitioner
alleged that a state search warrant was constitutionally defective be-
cause it was based on an affidavit signed with a fictitious signature.
Although the Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel Pugh v. Pale,389
held that such "John Doe" affidavits are insufficient to establish proba-
ble cause in federal proceedings, the court did not reach the merits of
the Maxey defendant's identical constitutional claim. The defendant
in Maxey had failed to raise the constitutional issue at trial, by post-
trial motions, or on direct appeal. The Seventh Circuit emphasized
that the defendant's failure to raise the issue was not relevant because
the state had provided an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the
claim. The defendant argued that unlike the federal courts, Illinois
courts upheld warrants based on "John Doe" affidavits and that, conse-
quently, the opportunity to litigate his claim in state court was mean-
ingless.390 In rejecting this argument, the Seventh Circuit specifically
noted that collateral federal review of state constitutional holdings was
what Stone sought to avoid. 39 1
A cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief was presented in
United States ex rel Hairston v. Warden.392 During the course of his
385. 585 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 962 (1979).
386. The defendant's pro se notice of appeal in the state court alleged various constitutional
violations, but his "court-appointed attorney did not pursue the fourth amendment claim." 585
F.2d at 292.
387. See also Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 434 U.S. 1038
(1978).
388. 591 F.2d 386 (7th Cir. 1979).
389. 401 F.2d 6 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 965 (1968).
390. In People v. Stansberry, 47 Ill. 2d 541, 268 N.E.2d 431, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 873 (1971),
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Pugh, holding that a search warrant based on an affidavit
signed with a fictitious name was not invalid as a matter of law. Maxey argued that Slansberrv
made his situation analogous to Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978), wherein the
Tenth Circuit affirmed habeas relief when the Supreme Court of Oklahoma refused to follow
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), in evaluating the admissibility of a confession. The Sev-
enth Circuit concluded that Gamble was distinguishable because Stansberr, does not "flagrantly
disregard" Supreme Court precedent. 591 F.2d at 389-90.
391. Alternatively, the court concluded that failure to raise the objection waived it under Illi-
nois procedural law and thus habeas corpus review was precluded under Wainwright. Id. at 391.
392. 597 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1979).
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state court trial, the defendant had challenged the constitutionality of
the Illinois alibi-notice statute. In upholding the constitutionality of
the provision, the state trial judge forced the defendant to abandon his
alibi defense. While the conviction was being affirmed on appeal, the
United States Supreme Court, in Wardius v. Oregon,3 93 invalidated an
alibi-notice statute similar to that of Illinois. Because the inability to
raise an alibi defense undermined the integrity of the factfinding proc-
ess, Wardius was given retroactive effect in examining Hairston's claim.
In appealing the district court's issuance of the writ, the state re-
spondents argued that Wardius ought to be construed in the context of
the holdings in Stone and Sykes, suggesting that "Wardius cannot be
violated unless the defendant offers an alibi defense at trial and the
defense is excluded." 394 The court in Hairston rejected this implied
analogy, finding that the state trial judge had effectively precluded use
of the alibi defense, thus the defendant's conviction was constitution-
ally defective.
The exhaustion of state remedies requirement of the federal
habeas corpus statute395 complements the principles of Stone and
Sykes, in satisfying the interests of comity in federal review of state
convictions. For example, in Moore v. Duckworth,396 the Seventh Cir-
cuit examined the post-conviction remedies available to an Indiana
prisoner. Finding that there was "ample opportunity to present claims
for relief in state courts, ' 3 9 7 the court of appeals held that the habeas
petition was premature. Conversely, in considering the exhaustion re-
quirement for a speedy trial claim raised in United States ex rel. Barks-
dale v. Sielaff,398 the court found that where exhaustion of Illinois post-
conviction remedies would be futile, habeas relief was available.
In two cases this term, the court addressed the issue of the nature
of the liberty interest required to implicate due process. In Durso v.
Rowe, 399 the court held that a plaintiff in a section 1983 action must be
given the opportunity to prove that an official practice existed which
conditioned revocation of work-release status on proof of misconduct.
Such a practice, if shown, could give rise to a justifiable expectation in
393. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
394. 597 F.2d at 608.
395. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c) (1979).
396. 581 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1978). The defendant in Moore asserted constitutional error in
that he had been unable to assist his counsel and he had been denied a speedy trial.
397. Id. at 644-45, quoting Langley v. State, 256 Ind. 199, 267 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1971).
398. 585 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1978). The court noted that the Illinois "waiver" doctrine pre-
cluded meaningful post-conviction relief. See also United States ex rel. Williams v. Morris, 594
F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1979).
399. 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1121 (1979).
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a liberty interest which would require procedural due process in revo-
cation of work release status. In Christopher v. Board of Parole,40O the
court relied on the rationale of Meachum v. Fano40 1 in holding that
even prior to the effective date of parole, a parole grantee had a justifia-
ble expectation that adverse action would not be taken except for mis-
behavior or upon the occurrence of specific events. That justifiable
expectation in the liberty interest is the basis for the requirement of
procedural due process. In Christopher, the court defined the compo-
nents of procedural due process which are necessary in the context of
revocation of a grant of parole. During his hearing before the parole
board, the petitioner was allowed to present affidavits and other docu-
mentary evidence on his behalf. Also, he was represented by retained
counsel. The petitioner claimed a due process violation in that he did
not have the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses by
compelling their appearance. The petitioner contended that he was
"virtually" a parolee, and was entitled to a full Morrisey-type hear-
ing40 2 including confrontation of witnesses. In rejecting this argument,
the Seventh Circuit balanced the substantial governmental interest in
whether parole would be rescinded for a prisoner still in custody,
against the parole grantee's justifiable liberty expectation, and found
that "something less than a full panoply of due process rights" was
required.40 3 The court noted that the hearing satisfied the petitioner's
due process rights in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings, as
outlined in Wolff v. McDonnell.40 4 Recognizing the risk to prison se-
curity inherent in a full adversary hearing involving prisoner witnesses,
400. 589 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1978).
401. 427 U.S. 215 (1976). In Meachum, the Court held that transfer of a prisoner from one
penal institution to another did not trigger the protections of procedural due process. Although
the Court noted that the transfer adversely affected the prisoner, the Court held that discretionary
transfer did not involve a liberty interest, so long as the transfer was administrative and not puni-
tive or conditioned on prisoner misconduct.
402. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme Court established minimum
due process requirements for a parole revocation hearing: (1) written notice of the claimed viola-
tions of parole; (2) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (3) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses: (5) a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole
board; and, (6) a written statement by the fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.
403. 589 F.2d at 930.
404. The court summarized the requirements set forth in Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974), as:
(1) advance notice of the information to be considered at the hearing; (2) a written state-
ment of the evidence relied on and reasons for the decision; (3) the right of the prisoner
to be present; (4) the right to present documentary evidence in his behalf; (5) a qualified
right to have a representative present to aid the prisoner in presenting his case; and, (6) a
qualified right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his behalf. 589
F.2d at 928.
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the Court in Wolf held that confrontation of witnesses was not an es-
sential element of due process. The petitioner argued that as the wit-
nesses he sought to confront were not prisoners, this danger was not
present, and therefore Wo/fwas not dispositive. Balancing the govern-
mental interest against the interests of a parole grantee, the Seventh
Circuit held that the petitioner's due process rights were not violated by
his inability to confront the witnesses against him.
CONCLUSION
In an overview of the work of the United State Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, it is difficult to discern any one approach or
developing trend. The decisions of the court of appeals have been
thoughtful and wide-ranging, conscientiously examining a variety of
criminal law issues. While no single thread binds these cases together,
to a limited extent an identifiable pattern is emerging. Adhering to the
implicit mandate of Stone v. Powell, the Seventh Circuit has truly be-
come a court of review. The appellate focus has shifted, testing only
the opportunity for a fair trial, not the fairness of the trial itself. As a
corollary, the defense counsel is the primary guardian of the defend-
ant's rights and lack of diligence in protecting or pursuing those rights
at trial will foreclose further consideration.

